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I. INTRODUCTION:  PREDATORY LENDING IN CONTEXT 
I have argued elsewhere that black people’s money is literally a 
distinctive currency worth less than white people’s money, both socially 
and materially.1  Through blacks’ historic confinement to segregated 
markets immune to legal attack and the operation of a culture of dealing 
that is permeated by economic stereotypes and practices borne of blacks’ 
unequal material conditions, money in the hands of black Americans has 
come to be devalued like the currency of a “Third World” country.2  The 
devaluation has taken on a life of its own.  The assumption that black 
people’s money is worth less taints commercial transactions of all sorts and 
perpetuates blacks’ subordinate economic status.  Nowhere is the adverse 
impact of this interaction of race, culture, law, and economics better 
reflected than in the area of personal finance and the lack of success that 
blacks encounter in transactions with financial institutions and other firms 
dealing in money as a commodity. 
Black Americans experience a number of problems in their efforts to 
obtain and use credit.3  Of particular concern is their vulnerability to so-
called “predatory lenders.”  Predatory lending is “characterized [by] a 
combination of unfair loan terms [particularly high interest rates and fees] 
and pressure tactics that limit the information and choices available to 
borrowers, especially those targeted because of particular vulnerabilities.”4  
                                                 
 1. See Regina Austin, “Black People’s Money:”  An Essay on the Interaction of Law, 
Economics, and Culture in the Context of Race (July 26, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with the American University Law Review) (providing an extended discussion of this 
thesis).  This research is grounded on the work of Princeton sociologist Viviana Zelizer.  See 
generally VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY (1994) (exploring how 
people earmark money by infusing it with social significance based on, among other things, 
the purpose for which it is used (i.e. a gift) or the identity of the possessor (i.e. women or the 
welfare poor)). 
 2. See discussion infra Part III.C (detailing how blacks are identified with the cash 
economy and how their money is therefore thought to be worth less). 
 3. See Brett Williams, Babies and Banks:  The “Reproductive Underclass” and the 
Raced, Gendered Maskings of Debt, in RACE 348, 360-61 (Steven Gregory & Roger Sanjek 
eds., 1994) (recognizing that blacks have greater access to credit cards than to mortgages).  
Blacks either experience too little credit of the right kind or too much credit of the wrong 
kind.  The first category relates to credit discrimination as it is commonly understood.  The 
second category includes what is considered predatory lending. 
 4. Deborah Goldstein, Note, Protecting Consumers from Predatory Lenders:  Defining 
the Problem and Moving Toward Workable Solutions, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 225, 255 
(2000). 
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Examples of targeted consumers include women, minorities, low-income 
wage earners, and senior citizens.5  The chief objects of criticism are 
financial firms that conduct business in what is variously known as the 
subprime, secondary, fringe, or alternative market, including payday 
lenders, car title pawn operators, small loan and mortgage companies, rent-
to-own stores, check cashing outlets, and rapid refund tax services.  Not all 
subprime lenders behave scandalously, of course, though the financial 
services industry as a whole might be criticized for not adequately 
regulating those entities essentially engaged in credit scams. 
There are many trenchant, critical legal assessments of the practices of 
predatory lenders.  Commentators typically call for the application of usury 
restrictions to curb the interest charged on transactions that lenders insist 
are not loans6 or suitability requirements that would compel lenders to 
determine if a loan is appropriate for a borrower given her or his capacity 
to make the required repayments.7  Others criticize the unfairness of the 
arbitration clauses that make borrowers’ efforts to resort to the courts 
impossible or decry the scarcity of publicly supported lawyers available to 
represent borrowers in fee-generating matters involving the more powerful 
and organized forces of the lending industry.8  Rather than reiterate the 
arguments that others have made, I want to investigate the subject of 
predatory lending from a different frame of reference. 
Legal discussions of predatory lending do not typically proceed from 
thick, rich descriptions of the contexts in which the transactions occur.  The 
reader gets only a vague sense of the borrowers’ relative socioeconomic 
status and the economic leverage that lending entities have over them.  The 
analysis particularly lacks explanations of why the borrowers needed credit 
or what their pressing debts or obligations were, why the sources of credit 
available to them were limited to those in the fringe market, what the 
negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction were like, and 
how the borrowers’ resort to such credit fits into larger patterns of dealing 
                                                 
 5. See Creola Johnson, Payday Loans:  Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 98-103 (2002) (evaluating a variety of studies offering conflicting data 
regarding the demographic characteristics of the customers of payday loans).  The 
Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions found that these customers have an average 
income of $25,131.  Id. at 99.  Both Wisconsin and Illinois studies determined that the 
majority of payday customers are women.  Id. at 100.  Additionally, a study from the 
American Association of Retired People found that “low-income and minority households 
are significantly more likely to have [cash-checking outlets] located within one mile of their 
homes than higher-income and nonminority households.”  Id. 
 6. E.g., Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial 
Services Marketplace:  The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking 
About the Role of Usury Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 657-66 (2000). 
 7. E.g., Johnson, supra note 5, at 133-45. 
 8. Id. 
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with matters of personal finance.  Contextual analysis might supply 
answers to some of these questions. 
Contextual analysis in the law is a powerful tool for discerning patterns 
of control, coercion, subjugation, resistance, and prosperity because it 
allows the legal analyst to address a problem by taking its “situatedness” 
fully into account.9  Contextual analysis can zoom in on the local level and 
scrutinize the intimate details of human or social interaction that are in the 
foreground of a problem.  It can also take a wide angle view of the 
institutional setting and other structural factors that form the backdrop of 
the problem.  Contextual analysis permits consideration of how the law can 
both solve a problem and exacerbate it at the same time.  It allows for the 
formulation of legal solutions to subjugation that are multidimensional or 
holistic. 
Closer examination of the context of ordinary, everyday local 
commercial transactions has the potential for revealing the discrimination 
embedded in segmented markets and the cultures that govern their 
transactions.10  Contextual analysis is in addition likely to identify the 
prejudices and stereotypes that are ingrained in those cultures that silently 
skew the outcome of countless individual transactions that occur in such 
markets every single day.11  In lieu of overt bias, contextual analysis 
facilitates consideration of more subtle factors such as contradictions 
between law on the books and the reality of these laws as enforced; the 
hegemonic processes by which the replication of disparities in rank and 
resources is made to seem like the product of the world view or consent of 
the subordinated; and the depoliticization of economic issues that results in 
the disenfranchisement of financially disadvantaged consumer-citizens. 
Insofar as “predatory lending” is concerned, contextual analysis would 
focus on the institutional structure and culture of the market for consumer 
                                                 
 9. See Iain Ramsay, Consumer Credit Law, Distributive Justice and the Welfare State, 
15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 177, 189 (1995) (citing Foucault’s suggestion of “studying local 
manifestations of power, the politics of >how things work at the level of ongoing 
subjugation’” and “patterning of restraint, coercion, power and opportunities” as an 
illustration of the need to look beyond the neo-classical approach of examining the structure 
of selling and lending credit in low-income credit markets); see also Regina Austin, Of 
False Teeth and Biting Critiques:  Jones v. Fisher in Context, 15 TOURO L. REV. 389, 389-90 
(1999) (enumerating the variety of factors that a reader should consider according to 
contextual/cultural studies).  This Essay applied contextual analysis to an appellate decision 
reducing the damages awarded in a battery case involving a plaintiff who was a nursing 
home worker and her former employers. 
 10. See Ramsay, supra note 9, at 193-94 (recognizing that the supposedly race-neutral 
rules are still discriminatory in impact, and thus, the image of “the impersonal market 
mechanism coldly allocating capital and credit to the most profitable investment and 
borrower” regardless of race and social status is in reality misleading).  Some examples of 
facially neutral practices include using postal codes to assess credit applications instead of 
formally “redlining” and giving additional weight to housing tenure and employment.  Id. 
 11. Id. 
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credit.  More contextual data about the sources of the borrowers’ economic 
vulnerability, as well as the financial practices, preferences, and 
perceptions both they and the lenders bring to financial transactions, would 
be very useful in formulating legal reforms or supporting alternative 
sources of credit that might enable borrowers to accomplish their economic 
goals.  Information regarding the context surrounding predatory lending 
might also counter untested assumptions about the ignorance and 
profligacy of borrowers of subprime credit, assumptions that undermine the 
movement to protect them.  Moreover, economic success or failure is 
viewed as a personal matter.  People do not talk about their financial 
difficulties because of the moral stigma attached to being in debt, even if it 
is caused by circumstances beyond the debtors’ control.12  Both those in 
debt and those not in debt discuss financial liability in terms of blame, 
complicity, and loss of control.13  Contextual analysis would expose the 
structural predicates to what is spoken of largely as a matter of individual 
failure.  Finally, debtors are not the only parties impacted by predatory 
lending.  Contextual analysis would also reveal the impact of predatory 
lending on nonparties to the transactions, namely the families of the debtors 
and the communities where they live and work.14  In sum, then, richer, 
more detailed and nuanced narratives about the difficulties borrowers 
encounter would facilitate the politicization of issues of credit availability 
and creditor abuse. 
Only a few judicial decisions offer a glimpse of an alternative, 
contextually-based perspective on predatory lending in the subprime 
market.  Smith v. Short Term Loans, L.L.C.,15 for example, is a case 
challenging the legality of a series of payday loans.16  A payday loan is the 
modern variant of salary selling or the salary advance.17  In the typical 
transaction, a borrower obtains a small advance on his salary of between 
                                                 
 12. See Henry J. Sommer, Causes of the Consumer Bankruptcy Explosion:  Debtor 
Abuse or Easy Credit?, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 33, 55 (1998) (observing that the notion of 
indebtedness as an undesirable state dates back to Biblical times and the requirement in 
Deuteronomy that every seven years there shall be a release of debts). 
 13. See Williams, supra note 3, at 355 (describing how credit-card debt is personalized 
by both those who carry debt and those who do not, such that all credit-card users think that 
debtors are complicit and that there is some type of shameful blame associated with that 
debt). 
 14. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS:  TOWARDS A CURE FOR 
THE HIGH-COST CREDIT MARKET 205-14 (employing an economic externality analysis to 
describe the adverse spillover effect of high-cost lending on families, neighborhoods, and 
entire communities). 
 15. No. 99-C1288, 2001 WL 127303 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2001). 
 16. Id. at *19. 
 17. See generally Mark H. Haller & John V. Alviti, Loansharking in American Cities:  
Historical Analysis of a Marginal Enterprise, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 125, 125-26 (1977) 
(tracing the history of salary lending from the post-Civil War period through the early 1960s 
and the replacement of old-time salary lenders with modern racketeer loansharks). 
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$100 to $500 for a period of two weeks for a fee of between $15 and $35 
which represents an effective annual interest rate of between 300 and 
400%.18  The borrower writes a check for the amount of the loan and the 
fee which the lender agrees to hold until the borrower’s next payday.  In 
essence, the borrower writes a post-dated check for which he has 
insufficient funds in the bank and receives in exchange the face amount of 
the loan in the form of cash or a check.  Two weeks later, the borrower can 
redeem the check by paying the lender the full amount owed, allow the 
check to be cashed, or roll the loan over. 
The typical two-week time frame of the payday loan leaves borrowers 
with little opportunity to accumulate the surplus required to pay off the 
debt.19  Rollovers are quite common.  The borrower can pay a fee to extend 
the loan which means that the lender keeps the check and the borrower has 
an additional two weeks to redeem it.  Alternatively, the borrower can take 
out a new loan with the same or a different payday lender and use the 
proceeds of the new loan to pay off the old obligation.  Sometimes the new 
obligation is taken out in the name of the borrower’s spouse or co-
accountholder.  It is through rollover after rollover that payday loan 
customers become entrapped in what sympathetic commentators consider 
an “insidious downward spiral”20 or “a vicious cycle of indebtedness”21 
from which borrowers find it very difficult to extricate themselves.  Payday 
lenders require payment of the principal in full and do not allow for partial 
payment.22  As a result, some borrowers wind up paying renewal fees in 
amounts significantly exceeding what was borrowed without ever reducing 
the principal balance.23 
Payday loans appeal to borrowers who have “maxed out” or exhausted 
the limits on their credit cards, find pawning their valuables embarrassing, 
need a form of lending that does not demand a credit check, or realize that 
bouncing checks is very expensive.24  Unfortunately, the practices of 
payday lenders are intended to keep borrowers in perpetual debt.  The 
                                                 
 18. See Peter T. Kilborn, New Lenders with Huge Fees Thrive on Workers with Debts, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1999, at A1 (describing the increased numbers of payday lending 
companies through the 1990s and the typical rates and fees associated with these loans). 
 19. See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 6, at 632-33 (demonstrating quantitatively that, at 
the average income levels of $25,000 and $35,000, there is a deficit of $196 and $34 
respectively, after an individual pays for essential expenditures and the debt of the average 
payday loan).  The deficit grows substantially between $396 and $407 if one factors in the 
maximum allowable payday loan.  Id. 
 20. Id. at 633. 
 21. Johnson, supra note 5, at 4. 
 22. Id. at 3-4. 
 23. See, e.g., Kilborn, supra note 18, at A28 (noting the case of Shari Harris, a single 
mother who started with one loan of $150 with a fee of $33 and, after picking up seven total 
loans, wound up with a debt of $1,900 for which she was paying fees of $6,006 annually). 
 24. Id. 
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bottom line is that payday loans may be suitable for coping with an 
inadequate short-term cash flow situation but not for managing long-term 
financial problems.25 
One of the payday borrowers in Short Term Loans racked up a total of 
fifteen loans over an eight-month period in amounts ranging between $120 
and $400, and at annual percentage rates (APRs) ranging between 342.19 
and 421.54%.26  During roughly the same period, the other borrower took 
out eleven loans of between $150 and $400 with APRs between 342.19 and 
391.07%.27  The borrowers executed post-dated checks with each 
transaction and, after a certain point, wage assignments as well.28   
In their lawsuit, the borrowers claimed Short Term Loans and two of its 
agents who were attorneys charged exorbitant rates, failed to make proper 
disclosures with the loans, and sent collection letters that suggested an 
independent entity was attempting to collect the debts.29  Plaintiffs alleged 
violations of the Truth in Lending Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act, the Illinois Wage Assignment Act, and the Illinois Consumer Fraud 
Act, as well as a claim of common law unconscionability.30  The 
defendants’ response to the allegations is intriguing: 
The defendants argue that plaintiffs were sophisticated “Ponzi schemers” 
engaged in an elaborate check-kiting scheme.  Specifically, the 
defendants argue that the plaintiffs would obtain payday loans from 
multiple lenders on multiple occasions, using one loan to pay off 
another.  The defendants assert that the plaintiffs pledged their income to 
several lenders, borrowing more than their weekly income, and knowing 
that they could not repay all of the loans.  The plaintiffs’ intent, argue the 
defendants, was to defraud their creditors and to make a profit on this 
scheme.31 
                                                 
 25. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 72 (citing an industry trade group proposal that would 
warn consumers of the limited benefit of payday loans and further notify potential 
borrowers that payday loans are intended only “as a short-term cash-flow solution”). 
 26. Smith v. Short Term Loans, L.L.C., No. 99-C1288, 2001 WL 127303, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 14, 2001). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at *6. 
 30. Id. at *2. 
 31. Id. at *1; see LEE E. NORRGARD & JULIA M. NORRGARD, CONSUMER FRAUD:  A 
REFERENCE HANDBOOK 31-32 (1998) (describing classic investment fraud schemes such as 
the Ponzi scheme and the pyramid scheme).  A Ponzi scheme is a type of pyramid scam.  Id.  
It is named after Charles Ponzi, who in 1920 enticed 30,000 to 40,000 people to buy ninety 
day notes at fifty percent interest.  Id.  The early “investors” in the scheme were paid with 
funds contributed by the later investors.  Id.  Each round of a Ponzi scheme requires an 
increasingly greater number of investors in order to pay both the principal and interest due 
to those who came before.  Id.  The scheme falls apart when the organizer can no longer con 
enough new participants to pay the older investors.  Id.  See also CHARLES J. WOELFEL, THE 
DICTIONARY OF BANKING 141 (1994) (defining check kiting as the “making use of fictitious 
balances by drawing against uncollected funds”); GRETCHEN MORGENSON & CAMPBELL R. 
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The plaintiffs in turn admitted using the proceeds of one loan to pay off 
another.32  However, they asserted that they primarily used the loans “for 
consumer purposes, such as buying children’s clothes and paying certain 
utility bills.”33  Plaintiffs further argued that their pattern of borrowing was 
a manifestation of “an unfortunate downward spiral of necessity 
characteristic of payday borrowers . . . .  Short Term Loans was well aware 
of this characteristic spiral and actually facilitated it through its lending 
practices.”34 
Short Term Loans, then, is not a simple tale of an overreaching creditor 
and ignorant, helpless borrowers.  Rather, the borrowers seemingly treated 
formally-made loans as if they were informal credit arrangements to be 
artfully ducked and dodged like ordinary bills.  The creditor, a formal 
lender, for its part took profitable advantage of the informal, almost semi-
illegal, habits of the borrowers’ personal finance.  This case essentially 
boils down to a contest between the formal and the informal with the 
creditor betting that the formal would ultimately prevail.  The creditor 
basically represented the formal.  It was a corporate entity with a fixed 
location, form contracts, and hired agents and lawyers.35  Nearly everything 
else about the loan smacked of the informal:  the amounts involved were 
small, the loan terms were short, the nature of the interaction between the 
borrowers and the creditors was frequent and face-to-face, and the course 
of transacting mimicked the sort of money juggling desperate people 
typically engage in to stretch their limited funds.36  The formal lender got 
an edge over the borrowers by incorporating into the transaction informal 
practices of dealing with debt with which the borrowers were probably 
familiar, if not comfortable, like writing post-dated checks.  The debt 
accumulated like a gigantic snowball that the borrowers eventually could 
not outrun.  When the borrowers’ juggling act finally gave out, the lender 
might have resorted to the criminal process which was available to it, as the 
references to Ponzi schemes and check-kiting suggest; payday lenders have 
                                                 
HARVEY, THE NEW YORK TIMES DICTIONARY OF MONEY AND INVESTING 161 (2002) 
(defining check kiting as “[t]he practice of depositing and drawing checks at two or more 
banks and taking advantage of the time it takes for the second bank to collect funds from the 
first bank”).  In check kiting, a depositor makes a deposit in one bank and draws on that sum 
by writing a check and depositing it in a second bank.  The depositor thereby takes 
advantage of the time it takes for the second bank to collect the funds from the first.  Id. at 
161. 
 32. Smith v. Short Term Loans, L.L.C., No. 99-C1288, 2001 WL 127303, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 14, 2001). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. (characterizing the defendant, Short Term Loans, LLC, as an entity located 
in Elk Groves Village, Illinois with several agents who are also named defendants). 
 36. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28 (detailing the character of the loans at 
issue in Short Term Loans). 
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prosecuted delinquent borrowers for writing “bad checks.”37  Instead Short 
Term Loans allegedly employed deceptive debt collection procedures (a 
vestige of the informal economy).38  The borrowers, however, had the 
benefit of a bit of formality too; they invoked the legal remedies that are 
available in the formal loan sector to hold the creditor at bay.39 
Payday loans, then, involve the interplay between the formal and the 
informal, both with regard to the structure of the lending entity and with 
regard to the mode of transacting.  It is difficult to determine whether as a 
group small-sum borrowers, like the Short Term Loans plaintiffs, truly 
benefit from having access to loans from a formal subprime lender or 
whether in the end they are left with more debt and fewer options for 
dealing with it than if they had been initially relegated to borrowing from a 
more informal lending source, albeit one with less money to loan.  Formal 
lenders would justify the extension of their financial products to debtors 
occupying the lowest socioeconomic tiers on the grounds that they, no less 
than the affluent, are deserving of the benefits of a democratization of 
credit, which is to say “formal credit.”  Nonetheless, the suitability of the 
options available to small-sum debtors is important because credit is an 
essential component of the social safety net that protects citizen-consumers 
from excessive financial insecurity.   
In this Article, I explore the role of informality in small-sum lending.  I 
begin with a consideration of informal credit as a component of the social 
safety net protecting the least well-off, small-sum borrowers.40  Next I look 
at subprime lending in terms of how it fits into the overall market for small-
sum loans by outlining the landscape of alternative sources of credit as 
characterized by various combinations of formality and informality.41  
From there, I speculate as to how individual subprime loan transactions are 
facilitated by cultural understandings that cause small-sum borrowers to 
prize both informality and cash as components of their financial dealings.42  
                                                 
 37. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 78-80 (focusing on the unfair collection practices of 
payday lenders and the practice of suing customers who default on loans under “bad-check” 
laws).  For instance, in a county court in Ohio, at least twelve payday lenders filed over 365 
complaints, many of which included damages for the customers’ violations of laws 
prohibiting consumers from writing checks not backed by sufficient funds in their checking 
account.  Id. at 79. 
 38. See Short Term Loans, 2001 WL 127303, at *10 (observing that the collection letter 
sent to the plaintiffs “presents enough ambiguity that an unsophisticated consumer might be 
misled”); see also id. at *2 (describing the letter, argued to constitute a violation of the Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act, that the defendant sent to the plaintiffs in an effort to collect 
the outstanding loans through a lawyer). 
 39. See id. at *2-*3 (summarizing the complicated procedural history in the case 
whereby the borrowers sued the lenders for violations of several federal and state lending 
and consumer fraud laws). 
 40. See discussion infra Part II.A-C. 
 41. See discussion infra Part II.D-E. 
 42. See discussion infra Part III. 
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As suggested by my earlier discussion of the benefits of contextual 
analysis, the macro and micro levels of analysis together reveal a complex 
interaction between formality and informality that is a significant source of 
the exploitation of consumers of the small loans that constitute predatory 
lending.  Fundamentally, predatory lending transactions mix the advantages 
of the informal and disadvantages of the formal in a particularly potent 
way.  These transactions harm the most vulnerable consumers, those who 
are confined to or have been socialized in the ways of the cash economy.  
In the final section, I will consider the notion of the democratization of 
credit and suggest how the infusion of the positive values of informality 
into the ideal of democratized credit might help curb predatory lending.43 
Evidence exists that blacks and Latinos are disproportionately impacted 
by predatory lending.44  Throughout the discussion that follows, I will note 
the role that race and ethnicity play in the exploitation of debtors by 
predatory lenders.  Rather than focus directly on racism and ethnocentrism 
or the legal rubrics that expressly address racial and ethnic discrimination, I 
hope to isolate the more subtle mechanisms of bias and victimization by 
concentrating on the interplay between formality and informality. 
II. THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET AND INFORMALITY IN LENDING 
A. Credit and the Social Safety Net 
Informal small-sum lending has traditionally been a part of the social 
safety net protecting individuals and families from poverty and financial 
ruin.  The social safety net consists of mechanisms aimed at mitigating the 
adverse effects of the “free market” on economically marginalized 
individuals or groups.45  The safety net in essence provides a degree of 
security or protection against various life cycle contingencies (such as old 
age, sickness, disability, or unemployment), unforeseen catastrophic events 
(such as natural disasters or the premature death of a family’s principal 
breadwinner), and the normal operations of a capitalist economy which 
inevitably leave some citizens impoverished or in jeopardy of being 
impoverished.  Dislocations brought about by changes in the economy 
and/or the regulatory environment such as we are presently experiencing 
(outsourcing, growth of the low-wage service sector, escalating 
                                                 
 43. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 44. See PETERSON, supra note 14, at 218 (stating that there exists “indisputable 
evidence suggesting minorities with comparable education and income are nevertheless 
disproportionately served by subprime mortgage lenders”). 
 45. See generally SOCIAL SAFETY NETS:  ISSUES AND RECENT EXPERIENCES 7 & n.1 (Ke-
young Chu & Sanjeev Gupta eds., 1998) (analyzing the purpose of social safety nets in 
economic reform, particularly in the context of IMF reform packages). 
AUSTIN.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 1/17/2005  11:17:48 AM 
2004] PREDATORY LENDING AND CREDIT DEMOCRATIZATION 1227 
bankruptcies) may prompt a need for changes in the social safety net.  Of 
course, the safety net does more than protect economic well-being.  The 
self-respect and dignity of individuals, the stability of families, and the 
cohesiveness of groups are undergirded by the floor of financial security 
provided by the safety net.46 
Credit is a component of the social safety net.  People borrow small 
sums for reasons that are related to the fulfillment of the safety net’s 
goals.47  They use credit to enhance or maintain their productivity (e.g., to 
start a business, invest in an education, or subsist until new employment is 
found), to consume, and to provide a measure of income security or 
insurance in times of enhanced risk.48  It is morally imperative that nearly 
all citizens participate in the benefits of our consumer society at a certain 
level.  Access to credit assures access to basic necessities for debtors who, 
because of un- or under-employment, lack an adequate income to pay for 
essentials like food, shelter, and medicine.49  Beyond that, some minimal 
notion of the good life supports borrowing for isolated, unexpected 
emergencies or special occasions, like the illness of a family member or a 
wedding,50 as well as cyclical borrowing, which occurs at Christmas time 
or just before schools open in the fall, results when a family’s expenses 
temporarily exceed revenues.51  Thus, consumer credit is significant not 
just to “finance a consumer lifestyle” but also “to ease financial 
hardship.”52  As a result of the role that credit plays in maintaining the 
social safety net, affordability (by the class constrained) and the prevention 
of discrimination (against racial and ethnic minorities and women) are 
understandable priorities for credit regulators.53 
B. The Informal Economy and the Social Safety Net 
The social safety net is not limited to entities in the formal economy.  
The mechanisms that compose the social safety net range from formal 
                                                 
 46. See generally Ramsay, supra note 9, at 181, 192, 195 (discussing the distributive 
values that should govern the regulation of consumer credit). 
 47. See MARY DALY & JIM WALSH, COMBAT POVERTY AGENCY, MONEYLENDING AND 
LOW INCOME FAMILIES 90, 99-101 (1988) (describing a study that found that low-income 
Irish borrowers depend on credit from door-to-door moneylenders for their most basic 
needs).  
 48. See Timothy H. Nourse, The Missing Parts of Microfinance:  Services for 
Consumption and Insurance, 21 SAIS REV., Winter-Spring 2001, at 61, 64-65 (explaining 
the interconnection between the various purposes for which consumers seek financial 
services). 
 49. See Ramsay, supra note 9, at 177 (noting the use of credit in achieving mobility and 
status, particularly in the context of race and gender). 
 50. DALY & WALSH, supra note 47, at 99. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Ramsay, supra note 9, at 180. 
 53. Id. at 181. 
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programs administered by the government (such as Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families or TANF)54 to informal charity provided by private 
individuals or community-based organizations.  For the least well-off 
consumers, the informal economy in general, with its informal practices 
and procedures, forms a vital part of the social safety net.55  People with 
limited skills, expertise, money, access to credit, or ties to wide-ranging 
markets can survive in the informal economy when opportunities in the 
formal economy are foreclosed to them.56  Informal modes of economic 
activity tend to be small scale, local, face-to-face, and dependent upon 
social relations or social capital.57  They also tend to involve limited 
financial capital.58  Furthermore, informal modes of transacting tend to be 
more malleable than formal modes of contracting.  As a result, the informal 
economy has a flexible, improvisational character that makes it responsive 
to adverse economic circumstances and conditions. 
In addition, the informal economy operates in the openings created by 
the gap between law on the books and actual law enforcement.59  People 
living on the margins and realistically assessing whether they can afford to 
abide by every law exploit openings in the regulatory regime to create 
informal economic opportunities for themselves.60  But as marginalized 
consumers seek to gain an advantage by walking the line between the 
formal and the informal, or the legal and the illegal or criminal, they also 
subject themselves to heightened exploitation from the lack of regulatory 
oversight of the informal actors with whom they deal.  Thus, ordinary 
consumers in the informal economy are always vulnerable to overreaching, 
                                                 
 54. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 681-687 (2004). 
 55. See generally Regina Austin, “The Black Community,” Its Lawbreakers, and a 
Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1789, 1803-06 (1992) [hereinafter Austin, The 
Black Community] (describing generally a politics of identification with lawbreaking within 
the black community, noting specifically the role of those individuals who bridge the gap 
between the street “lawbreakers” and the black middle class by making everyday choices 
about which laws to obey); Regina Austin, “An Honest Living”:  Street Vendors, Municipal 
Regulation, and the Black Public Sphere, 103 YALE L.J. 2119, 2119-20 (1994) [hereinafter 
Austin, An Honest Living] (stating that lawbreaking in the form of informal economy 
activity is the only means of economic survival for many poor blacks). 
 56. See Austin, An Honest Living, supra note 55, at 2123 (explaining how informal 
black street vendors include sellers who are either foreclosed from or choose to opt out of 
formal markets). 
 57. See discussion infra note 146. 
 58. Austin, The Black Community, supra note 55, at 1804. 
 59. See generally Jared N. Day, Credit, Capital and Community:  Informal Banking in 
Immigrant Communities in the United States, 1880-1924, 9 FIN. HIST. REV. 65, 70-72 (2002) 
(describing how legislation failed to disrupt the overall structure of “padrones,” a complex 
system of immigrant banking within the Greek and Italian communities in New York at the 
turn of the century); Ivan Light, Numbers Gambling Among Blacks:  A Financial Institution, 
42 AM. SOC. REV. 892, 897 (1977) (explaining how the numbers racket was a method for 
individuals to “invest” small sums for a potentially large reward and a source of credit for 
individuals and businesses). 
 60. Austin, The Black Community, supra note 55, at 1769. 
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incompetence, and economic instability.  Moreover, the informal economy 
works best where formal firms fail or fear to tread.  Thus financial firms in 
the formal sector are always on the lookout for opportunities to make a 
profit by moving into or absorbing areas of the informal economy that have 
proven to be lucrative.  The formal actors will move into the sector and 
force the informal actors out of business.  Without prior notice, regulatory 
loopholes can be closed, strict formality demanded, and customers caught 
on the wrong side of the line may be left without recourse. 
The workings of the informal economy are by their very nature 
circumspect and partially or completely hidden from the view of outsiders.  
As a result, it is difficult to track its dealings, measure its scope, and 
definitively assess who comes out ahead at the end of the day. 
C. Informality of Form Versus Informality in Mode of Transacting 
By providing credit outside of formal markets via informal transactions, 
informal lenders are part of the social safety net twice over.  They are 
loosely organized and operate on a small scale.61  They may specialize or 
cater to a discrete niche of the loan market.62  They are physically and 
socially accessible, lend very small amounts of money, employ fairly 
simple and transparent procedures, and process requests or applications for 
loans rapidly.63  Informal lenders tend to exploit “[c]ost advantages in 
information gathering” and “to utilize more effective enforcement 
mechanisms.”64  Of course, intimidation and harassment come to mind 
when informal lenders are mentioned.  The flexibility of informal lending 
allows the lenders “to reach borrowers beyond the profitable reach of the 
formal sector, and to reduce transaction costs usually below those in the 
formal sector.”65  Most importantly, informal lenders operate beyond the 
reach of legal regulations, particularly those placing ceilings on interest 
rates, mandating disclosure of terms to borrowers, and limiting debt 
collection practices.66  The possibility of sharp practice and abuse inheres 
in informal lending, but this varies with the character of the informal 
lender. 
Formal lenders, by contrast, tend to operate on a larger scale; “the 
transactions are usually arms-length, and loan terms more standardized,” 
                                                 
 61. PRABHU GHATE, THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, INFORMAL FINANCE:  SOME 
FINDINGS FROM ASIA 6 (1992). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Sherrie L.W. Rhine & Maude Toussant-Comeau, The Use of Formal and Informal 
Financial Markets Among Black Households, 45 CONSUMER INT. ANN. 146, 146 (1999). 
 65. GHATE, supra note 61, at 6-7. 
 66. Id. 
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generally being reduced to writing.67  In many cases, formal lenders are 
subject to a panoply of regulations that theoretically protect borrowers, but 
allow the creditor to make a profit on the transaction.68 
Formality and informality do not merely describe the way in which a 
lending entity is structured; they may also characterize the mode or style of 
transacting in which the entity engages.  In terms of methods of doing 
business, “[i]nformality is characterized by highly personalized loan 
transactions entailing face-to-face dealings with borrowers and flexibility 
in respect of loan purpose, interest rates, collateral requirements, maturity 
periods, and debt rescheduling.”69  A formally structured lender may 
employ informal lending practices.  Consider the ABC Loan Co., a black-
owned pawnshop located in South Central Los Angeles, which was profiled 
in a 1995 documentary “No Loans Today” directed by Lisanne Skylar.70  
ABC’s best customers were those who fell short at the end of every 
month.71  They would pawn their valuables until they received their 
paychecks or benefits checks, which they would cash at ABC for a one 
percent fee.72  Although regulated and subject to the oversight of the police 
department’s pawn detail, ABC operated on an informal basis.73  Loans 
were limited to $25.74  For persons without traditional identification, 
alternative sources, such as a traffic ticket signed in front of an officer, 
would suffice.  When a customer tried to pawn an item of personal 
significance, but of little intrinsic value, the clerk could point to a sign 
indicating “No Loans Today” so as to avoid insulting the customer.75  The 
customer was left with a bit of hope and dignity. 
For the consumer seeking a loan, the choice is not an absolute one 
between formality and informality, but rather one of choosing the option 
that offers the best mix of the advantages of both.  Consider the qualities 
consumers might want from a provider of financial services: 
. . . reliability, trustworthiness, flexible hours, outreach, physical and 
cultural accessibility, provision of a range of financial services, speedy 
procedures, understanding of clients’ businesses and the ability to 
communicate with the clients.  More specifically, for credit, clients also 
want discretion, transparency, seasonally sensitive products and terms, 
timeliness, procedures tailored to clients’ needs, fair interest rates, 
                                                 
 67. Id. at 7. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 6. 
 70. NO LOANS TODAY:  SOUTH CENTRAL LOS ANGELES (First Run/Icarus Films 1995). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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money available at short notice, sufficient capital for clients’ needs and 
[the option of] repayment in cash or kind . . .76 
From the borrower’s point of view there are numerous advantages 
generally associated with informal lending (flexible terms, geographical 
accessibility, and rapid approval), but there are also disadvantages (limited 
range of services, insufficient capital, and high interest rates) that formality 
cures.  At the same time, the disadvantages of formality (longer approval 
processes, collateral requirements, lack of transparency, and 
inhospitableness) may be remedied by a bit of informality.  Of course, not 
every consumer would make the same tradeoff between the benefits of 
formality and the advantages of informality. 
D. The Lower Income Consumer and the Continuum of Choices 
The options of a lower income consumer short on money to meet current 
obligations can be grouped into roughly three categories:  savings-like 
credit, external sources of credit, and do-it-yourself credit creation.  The 
options will be discussed in order of their declining advantage to the 
consumer. 
1. Savings-like credit 
Most people confronted with financial difficulties resort to their own 
savings first, if they have any.77  Their funds may be located in formal 
institutions like banks or credit unions and take the form of formal time-
deposit savings or money market accounts, certificates of deposit, or 
savings bonds.78  Alternatively, their savings may be “invested” in informal 
rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) or savings clubs. 
A ROSCA is a club or a collective of participants who make 
contributions, generally monetary, on a periodic basis to a common fund 
which is distributed in whole or in part to each contributor on a rotating 
basis until everyone has collected.79  Participation in a ROSCA requires a 
                                                 
 76. See J. Howard M. Jones & Owuraka Sakyi-Dawson, Linking Formal and Informal 
Financial Intermediaries in Ghana:  A Way To Increase Women’s Access to Financial 
Services?, in WOMEN AND CREDIT:  RESEARCHING THE PAST, REFIGURING THE FUTURE 271, 
278 (Beverly Lemire et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter WOMEN AND CREDIT]. 
 77. See E. THOMAS GARMAN & RAYMOND E. FORGUE, PERSONAL FINANCE 126 (6th ed. 
2000) (suggesting that maintaining a savings account can allow flexibility in times of 
financial hardship). 
 78. Id. at 125. 
 79. Shirley Ardener, Women Making Money Go Round:  ROSCAs Revisited, in MONEY-
GO-ROUNDS:  THE IMPORTANCE OF ROTATING SAVINGS AND CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS FOR 
WOMEN 1 (Shirley Ardener & Sandra Burman eds., 1995).  A participant receives as much 
from the fund as they contribute over the life of the ROSCA.  ROSCAs are part credit union 
(particularly for those who draw their share early in the process), part savings club 
(particularly for those whose turn comes toward the end), and part insurance scheme 
(particularly for those who have emergencies and are allowed to collect out of turn).  Louis 
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regular income and social capital.80  ROSCAs operate on trust and peer 
pressure to insure that the necessary sums will be saved by the members 
and paid into the common fund on a timely basis.81  Some participants need 
the social coercion of a ROSCA obligation to save, and ROSCAs make 
saving easier.82  There is little paperwork or documentation to fill out.  The 
payback is relatively quick.  Most ROSCAs are short-lived, though a new 
round of collective saving may start as soon as one ends.  The operations 
tend to be local or community-based and therefore close to home or work; 
some ROSCAs even extend the benefit of a traveling banker who visits 
participants for the purpose of collecting and paying out funds.  ROSCAs 
also supply the economic benefits that can flow from social capital:  
financial information, advice, and economic opportunities to exploit.83  The 
early takers from the common pot get a bit of credit in the process, while 
the late takers are essentially creditors who receive no interest.  In addition, 
the credit ROSCAs extend is only for relatively short terms.84  The biggest 
disadvantage of ROSCAs is that the organizers and participants may be 
untrustworthy and put the savings of the more reliable parties in jeopardy.  
That is why some ROSCAs allocate the pot based on trustworthiness (with 
the least reliable going last), as opposed to need, luck (as where the order is 
determined by lottery), or bidding (as where the pot goes to the participant 
who offers to make the highest contribution to the pot in the future).85   
By contrast, a savings club pools its members’ savings in a common 
bank account and makes emergency loans to members in need or funds 
those wishing to finance micro-enterprises.86  Savings clubs require less in 
                                                 
Sterling, Partners:  The Social Organization of Rotating Savings and Credit Societies 
Among Exilic Jamaicans, 29 SOC. 653, 657 (1995) (describing the practices of ROSCAs 
known as “partners” formed by Jamaican immigrants in Manchester, England).  See also 
KELLEE S. TSAI, BACK-ALLEY BANKING:  PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS IN CHINA 77-78, 104-17 
(2002) (describing the operation of Chinese ROSCAs, called “huis,” that were initiated by 
the women left behind to pay the costs of the immigration of their male relatives to 
America); Eda Hastick, Susus:  New Life for a Caribbean Grassroots Approach to Savings, 
WADABAGEI:  A JOURNAL OF THE CARIBBEAN AND ITS DIASPORA, Summer/Fall 1998, at 121, 
123-26 (describing the practices of ROSCAs known as “susus,” formed by Caribbean 
immigrants in the United States).  Such associations, which are common throughout Africa, 
Asia, and the Caribbean and known by various names, have been formed in this country by 
members of immigrant groups, but are rare among indigenous blacks or other native-born 
poor and working class groups.  Id. 
 80. Hastick, supra note 79, at 125, 126-27. 
 81. Sterling, supra note 79, at 662-63. 
 82. Hastick, supra note 79, at 128-29. 
 83. Ardener, supra note 79, at 9. 
 84. See generally Jones & Sakyi-Dawson, supra note 76, at 277 (listing a short term of 
less than month characteristic of advances made by collectors of informal Ghanaian 
ROSCAs known as “susus”). 
 85. Ardener, supra note 79, at 9. 
 86. See generally Ivan Light, Self-Help for the Urban Poor, AM. ENT. ONLINE, July-
Aug. 1996 (arguing that non-immigrant low-income communities would benefit from 
savings arrangements similar to ROSCAs), at http://www.taemag.com/issues/issue 
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the way of social capital and earnings and are therefore more suited to 
lower-income participants, like mothers receiving assistance from the state. 
Unfortunately, non-immigrant, low-income Americans have no tradition 
of forming ROSCAs or savings clubs as alternatives to dealing with formal 
financial institutions.87  The poor who would benefit most from such 
informal associations particularly lack the shared trust and solidarity that 
make such informal associations possible. 
2. External sources of credit 
If a debtor lacks savings and needs credit, she or he may be able to 
obtain a loan from a mainstream, formal institution like a bank, credit 
union, consumer finance company, or sales finance company, such as 
General Motors Acceptance Corporation or GMAC.  These sources, 
however, are most readily available to borrowers who have preexisting 
relationships with the entities or good credit records.88 
Alternatively, credit cards, which are generally issued by banks, also 
enable debtors to deal with financial emergencies and unexpected or 
uncontrollable changes in income or expenditures.  Access to credit cards is 
widening, and lower income Americans increasingly have credit cards.89  In 
fact, they are the fastest growing group of credit card holders in the 
country.90  Credit cards provide borrowers with a measure of flexibility in 
that borrowers have some choice with regard to the amount of the loan and 
the rate of repayment.91  Moreover, credit cards do not restrict where the 
borrowed funds are spent and may even allow the card holder to borrow 
cash.   
Statistical evidence suggests that poorer credit card holders use their 
cards as a form of “consumption insurance.”92  They maintain higher 
                                                 
ID.116/toc.asp (on file with the American University Law Review); Sterling, supra note 79, 
at 121 (describing how Jamaican “partners” savings clubs allow members the flexibility of 
withdrawing funds for unforeseen reasons). 
 87. See generally Light, supra note 86.    
 88. See GARMAN & FORGUE, supra note 77, at 187-89 (indicating that, in addition to 
making loans to customers with good credit records, depository institutions further reduce 
their risk by requiring collateral or a cosigner). 
 89. See generally Edward J. Bird et al., Credit Card Debt of the Poor:  High and 
Rising, 18 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 125 (1999) (speculating on the impact that the 
poor’s credit card debt might have in the event of an economic downturn). 
 90. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS:  AMERICANS IN DEBT 
24 (2000) (suggesting that credit card issuers see those with low incomes as attractive 
customers). 
 91. See EDWARD BIRD ET AL., INST. FOR RES. ON POVERTY, DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 1148-
97, CREDIT CARDS AND THE POOR 1 (1997), at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/irp/pubs 
/dp114897.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 92. See id. at 8-9, 11, 20 (noting that, in contrast to the “near-poor and the poor,” those 
in higher income groups use their credit cards as a “payment vehicle”).  During a recession, 
higher income households use their credit cards less while lower income households do the 
opposite.  Id. at 9. 
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balances during recessions to smooth the decline in their consumption, 
dictated by their worsening economic condition, and pay down their 
balances as well as secure more cards during economic upturns.93  
Interviews conducted in a predominately Latino community in Chicago 
found that the residents used credit cards as a device for maintaining 
consumption levels in periods of financial difficulty.  This occurred when 
their incomes declined due to death, illness, or unemployment or when 
their expenditures climbed due to an increase in living expenses or in the 
number of dependents.94  Credit card companies find lower income 
borrowers attractive because their lower creditworthiness justifies charging 
them higher interest rates and their greater tendency to miss or make late 
payments generates more fees.  The fees charged for merely processing 
applications for secured credit cards (which offer credit limits equal to the 
balance in linked savings accounts) are especially high; secured cards 
extend credit to holders who pose especially high risks.95 
Subprime lenders represent a third type of formal external source of 
credit, albeit one in which informal modes of transacting are used.  
Predatory lending will be discussed more fully below.96 
Some debtors are able to tap informal external sources that offer credit 
on very flexible terms.  Family, friends, acquaintances, neighbors, and co-
workers are typical sources of short-term loans and, in some cases, even 
gifts.97  Small local merchants or shopkeepers also extend informal credit to 
customers whom they know.98  Loans from these sources tend to be 
informal in that there is usually no written note or contract, the terms of 
repayment are not typically specified, and little or no interest is charged.99  
                                                 
 93. See id. (noting that while poor households use the economic booms to pay off their 
debts, non-poor households expand their debt during the same period). 
 94. See PHILIP BOND & ROBERT TOWNSEND, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, ECON. 
PERSP., FORMAL AND INFORMAL FINANCING IN A CHICAGO ETHNIC NEIGHBORHOOD 3, 4, 7 n.2 
(1996) (reporting results of a survey of a predominately Latino community regarding the use 
and sources of credit), at http://www.chicafed.org/publications/ 
economicperspectives/1996/epjul96.pdf (on file with the American University Law 
Review). 
 95. See GARMAN & FORGUE, supra note 77, at 164 (describing how secured credit card 
issuers advertise via “‘900’ telephone numbers” where the caller is charged a fee for the call 
and then charged an additional nonrefundable fee to process the application). 
 96. See discussion infra Part II.E (describing payday loans as a combination of formal 
and informal means of financing). 
 97. See Julia R. Henly, Informal Support Networks and the Maintenance of Low-Wage 
Jobs, in LABORING BELOW THE LINE:  THE NEW ETHNOGRAPHY OF POVERTY, LOW-WAGE 
WORK, AND SURVIVAL IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 179, 182-83 (Frank Munger ed., 2002) 
(noting that the assistance received from informal support networks varies with the income 
level of members). 
 98. See GHATE, supra note 61, at 33 (indicating that “consumption credit” granted by 
small stores is widely common). 
 99. See id. at 25 (suggesting that credit extended among friends and relatives may not 
always be interest free).  A further feature of this type of loan is often an “unwritten” 
reciprocity obligation.  Id.  There is an implicit assumption by the lender that the borrower 
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The “creditworthiness” of the borrower is a matter of the lender’s personal 
knowledge and judgment.100  Of course, the amounts lent are generally 
small because the pool of funds available is limited to the personal assets of 
the informal creditors.101  Trust and affinity provide some guarantee that 
the loan will be repaid.  The repayment may consist of the fulfillment of a 
reciprocal obligation of assistance in a time of need.102  The biggest 
drawback to relying on personal connections for credit is that the lender is 
more likely to be inquisitive about the borrower’s need for the loan.  
Privacy, confidentiality, anonymity, and freedom from embarrassment are 
not assured when borrowing through one’s social network. 
For people who are socially and economically attenuated or isolated 
from friends and relations, or who come from backgrounds devoid of deep 
pockets, the option of obtaining such informal credit may be restricted.103  
The amount of support a social network provides tends to vary with race 
and ethnicity.104  Minority social networks are generally less financially 
able to provide assistance than white social networks because of the 
intergenerational impact of racial and ethnic discrimination.105  For 
example, research has shown that the amounts and kinds of 
intergenerational support children receive typically depend on the 
socioeconomic and class status of their parents.106  “[I]nteractions among 
markets amplify discrimination in any one market into others,” while 
“personal discrimination in one period turns into structural discrimination 
in the next period.”107  Thus, the discrimination minority parents 
experienced in the labor market impacted their experiences in the housing 
                                                 
will return the favor “should their fortunes be reversed.”  Id. 
 100. See id. at 6 (describing that the small scale of informal lenders is based on the fact 
that lending is generally based upon “personal knowledge of the borrower”). 
 101. See id. at 23 (noting that intermittent lenders, like friends and family, make direct 
loans to debtors with their temporary surplus funds). 
 102. See Henly, supra note 97, at 184 (describing that repayment may be immediate in 
less intimate networks whereas the opposite is true for support networks with closer ties 
among the members). 
 103. See BOND & TOWNSEND, supra note 94, at 9-11 (reporting that the lower income 
residents of a Chicago Hispanic community who lacked proficiency in English tended to 
rely on friends more than those who were relatively well-off and who had a command of 
English). 
 104. See Henly, supra note 97, at 182-83 (noting that not just the amount but also the 
kind of support will vary due to the socioeconomic make-up of the social network). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Anne Francis-Okongwu, Looking up from the Bottom to the Ceiling of the 
Basement Floor:  Female Single-Parent Families Surviving on $20,000 or Less a Year, 24 
URB. ANTHROPOLOGY 313, 338-39, 340-44 (attributing racial differences in the network 
support and housing accommodations received by single mothers to the class and 
socioeconomic status of their parents). 
 107. Gary A. Dymski, Why Does Race Matter in Housing and Credit Markets? Current 
Research and Future Directions, in RACE, MARKETS, AND SOCIAL OUTCOMES 157, 184 
(Patrick L. Mason & Rhonda M. Williams eds., 1997). 
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market and vice versa.108  The parents’ experiences in those markets in turn 
not only impact their ability to provide money or housing assistance to their 
offspring, but also figure in the determination of the socioeconomic or class 
status of their offspring and the likelihood that the latter will need social 
support from their families. 
Individuals are not the only potential lenders motivated by affinity or 
empathy.  A number of organizations and institutions offer their members 
or individuals in the communities they serve a way out of difficult 
economic situations on a nonprofit basis that will not compromise the 
borrowers’ financial futures.  As contributors to the social safety net, local 
nonprofit organizations,109 including churches and mosques,110 engage in 
small-sum lending and charitable giving.111  In lieu of cash, these entities 
sometimes provide in-kind assistance such as prescription medicines or 
emergency car repairs.112   
The not-for-profit sector might be considered distinct from and a buffer 
between the formal and informal sectors.  Like actors in the informal 
economy, not-for-profits may be motivated by altruism, moral or religious 
commitment, or the desire to enjoy the benefits of reciprocal exchanges of 
obligation and respect.  On the other hand, the lending activities of these 
organizations may be as self-interested and manipulative as any for-
profit’s.  Surely, religiously-affiliated organizations lend as an adjunct to 
their spiritual proselytizing.  Nonprofits sustain themselves by seeking 
“symbolic capital,” i.e., honor and prestige which creates a debt on the part 
of the recipients that when called upon will generate material gain.  
Symbolic capital entitles nonprofit concerns to raise funds by proclaiming 
their past “good works.”113   Moreover, the credit provided by charitable 
                                                 
 108. See id. (describing that the result on the housing market appears in lower appraisals, 
residential segregation, and economic inequality). 
 109. LOCAL INDEP. CHARITIES OF AM., ABOUT US, at http://www.lic.org (last visited on 
Sept. 17, 2004) (providing a searchable database of more than six hundred local charities) 
(on file with the American University Law Review). 
 110. MUSLIM CMTY. SUPPORT SERVS., INC., ABOUT MCSS, at http://www. 
muslimsupport.org/index.html (last visited on Sept. 7, 2004) (describing the organization 
begun in 1999 as a support system for Muslim families in the New England area that 
provides for both financial and social services support based on the responsibilities dictated 
in the Muslim faith) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 111. See infra notes 115-20 (providing a number of examples of the type of assistance 
contributors to the social safety net provide). 
 112. AM. RED CROSS, COMMUNITY SERVICES, at http://www.redcross.org/more 
/commserv (last visited on Sept. 17, 2004) (listing a variety of non-monetary services the 
organization offers including home delivery of meals and transportation to medical 
appointments) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 113. See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 112-20 (Richard Nice 
trans. 1990); Carolyn Betensky, The Prestige of the Oppressed: Symbolic Capital in a Guilt 
Economy, in PIERRE BOURDIEU: FIELD WORK IN CULTURE 207, 208 (Nicholas Brown & Imre 
Szeman eds., 2000).  
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sources does not necessarily satisfy the needs of the recipient as to the 
amount of the loan, the terms, or the timing.114   
Many local utility companies offer assistance in the form of balanced 
payment options, deferred payment plans, and outright grants to help 
customers maintain service in times of financial hardship.115  Municipalities 
may also extend emergency assistance to individuals and families already 
receiving government assistance. 
In addition, some employers (including universities116 and 
municipalities117) offer emergency grants to employees as a kind of fringe 
benefit.  The programs are usually administered through the employers’ 
human resources departments.  When an employer provides such 
assistance, it perhaps should not be viewed as charity or disinterested 
largesse; rather it may indicate that the employer is not paying its 
employees an adequate wage.  That is very likely true with regard to the 
military.  Each branch of the armed forces has its own emergency 
assistance program which provides such services as emergency loans, 
education assistance, and community enhancement programs.118  As of 
                                                 
 114. Cf. PETER K. EISINGER, TOWARD AN END TO HUNGER IN AMERICA 120 (1998) 
(describing the limitations of the charitable provision of food to the hungry).   
 115. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HELP WITH YOUR UTILITY BILLS, at 
http://www.hud.gov.local/id/renting/energyprgms.cfm (last visited on Sept. 7, 2004); PAC. 
GAS AND ELEC. CO., FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, at 
www.pge.com/res/financial_assistance (last visited on Sept. 7, 2004) (outlining the 
availability of a number of programs that allow for low-income residents and others to 
receive financial assistance through Pacific Gas and Electric including Family Electric Rate 
Assistance (FERA), Relief for Energy Assistance through Community Help (REACH), as 
well as balanced payment plans) (on file with the American University Law Review); 
LEAVENWORTH COUNTY CHAPTER OF THE AM. RED CROSS, UTILITY ASSISTANCE, at 
http://leavenworthcounty.redcross.org/utility.htm (last visited on Sept. 7, 2004) (showing 
that these resources are available even in non-urban settings within the United States 
through a number of means including the American Red Cross) (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 116. UNIV. OF ALA. AT BIRMINGHAM, UAB FACULTY AND STAFF BENEVOLENT FUND:  
EMPLOYEE EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, at http://main.uab.edu/show.asp? 
durki’25309 (last visited on Sept. 7, 2004) (describing the objective of the Employee 
Emergency Assistance Program and outlining the operation of the program) (on file with the 
American University Law Review); CORNELL UNIV., EMERGENCY GRANT FUND, at 
http://www.assembly.cornell.edu/EA/EGF.html 2001 (last visited on Sept. 7, 2004) 
(explaining the Emergency Grant Fund as a confidential service and listing the criteria for 
eligibility) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 117. CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, DENVER EMPLOYEES EMERGENCY PROGRAM:  ABOUT 
US, at http://www.denvergov.org/deep/1794aboutus.asp (last visited on Sept. 7, 2004) 
(outlining a program that offers grants to city and county employees requiring financial 
assistance and asserting that the grants need not be repaid because they are funded by 
employee donations) (on file with the American University Law Review); CITY OF WICHITA, 
BYLAWS OF THE CITY OF WICHITA EMPLOYEES’ EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE FUND, at 
http://www.wichitagov.org/NR/rdonlyres/E1209A44-0B1F-468E-A030-77A41BE9D091/0/ 
Employee_Emergency_Assistance_Fund_Bylaws_15d.pdf (last visited on Sept. 7, 2004) 
(authorizing the fund to provide financial assistance to city employees in need) (on file with 
the American University Law Review). 
 118. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, MILITARY LOANS FROM PAYDAY LENDERS, at 
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January 2004, the Air Force Aid Society operated close to fifteen separate 
programs and offered $760,000 in grants and over $12 million in interest 
free loans.119  The Army’s program, which started in 1942, provides for 
emergency financial assistance to both active duty and retired soldiers 
based on demonstrable need.120  The armed forces have also responded 
directly to the problem posed by payday lenders located near military 
facilities.121  Because payday lenders use the post-dated checks given to 
them to support criminal prosecutions against the borrowers as a form of 
debt collection, the military has found itself in a position of losing troops 
caught in the payday loan cycle.122  Military leaders have supported 
legislation regulating payday lenders or declared such lenders off limits to 
military personnel.123 
If their personal network of informal lenders is nonexistent, tapped dry, 
or incapable of supplying sufficient funds, borrowers may be forced to 
resort to less savory alternatives, such as moneylenders or true loan sharks 
with criminal connections who operate on the wrong side of the law.  The 
best available information suggests that moneylenders or loan sharks are 
most likely to be found in immigrant communities.124  The interest charged 
                                                 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday/military2.cfm (last visited on Sept. 8, 2004) 
(presenting the alternatives to payday lending and loan sharking that are exclusive to the 
military especially including the Army Emergency Relief Fund, the Air Force Aid Society, 
the Navy Marine Corps Relief Society and Coast Guard Mutual Assistance as well as small 
loans available through private companies) (on file with the American University Law 
Review). 
 119. AIR FORCE AID SOC’Y, AFAS GUIDE FOR ASSISTANCE, at http://www.afas.org (last 
visited on Sept. 7, 2004) (documenting the many programs offered through the aid society 
for the year of 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 120. ARMY EMERGENCY RELIEF, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2003) (showing that Army 
Emergency Relief assisted a total of 53,865 individuals in 2003 with a total of assistance of 
$37,381,251 awarded), available at http://www.aerhq.org/AnnualReport2003. 
 121. Paul Fain, The Few, the Proud, the Indebted, MOTHER JONES, May/June 2004, at 19, 
19 (describing how these lending institutions are mixed in with the shops and restaurants 
right outside military bases); see also Russ Bynum, Army Launches Offensive Against 
Lenders, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2003, at A5 (suggesting that, outside of military bases, the 
signs of payday lenders and check cashing establishments are as “ubiquitous as golden 
arches”). 
 122. Rhonda Cook, Misery at High Interest:  Military Wants War on Payday Loans, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 4, 2003, at A1 (indicating that members of the military may be 
subject to court-martial should they not honor their debts); see also Bynum, supra note 121, 
at A1 (asserting that military personnel who do not pay their debt may lose their security 
clearances). 
 123. See Fain, supra note 121, at 19 (noting that the Judge Advocate General’s Corps 
declared a payday lender “off-limits to military personnel”).  A Navy Captain also testified 
before Georgia legislators “in favor of a bill imposing tough new penalties against payday 
lenders.”  Id.  See also Diana B. Henriques, Seeking Quick Loans, Soldiers Race into High-
Interest Traps, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2004, at A1, C3 (describing possible protection from a 
proposal for a federal cap on post-enlistment debt interest rates and a trade association 
military code of best practices). 
 124. See Dexter Filkins, In Some Immigrant Enclaves, Loan Shark Is the Local Bank, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2001, at A1 (describing activities of Latino “prestamistas” in the 
Washington Heights section of New York City); see also Juleyka Lantigua, The Progressive 
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by such informal lenders may be quite high, the amount available for 
lending may be limited in time and duration, and the operation may be so 
localized that the lender is unable to spread the risk.125  Their collection 
methods are more likely to be violent when compared to those of other 
informal lenders.126 
3. Do-it-yourself credit creation 
Finally, there are informal mechanisms that ordinary consumers employ 
to create a bit of credit for themselves when they are unable to draw on 
personal savings or to obtain a loan from an external source.  Some of these 
measures are close to, if not over, the line of illegality.  Figuratively, 
“robbing Peter to pay Paul” is a common maneuver among the cash-
strapped.  They juggle bills by paying one creditor and holding off the 
others or by taking funds earmarked to satisfy one account and using them 
to settle some other obligation.  Thus, the rent may get paid first, while the 
phone company and the utility company are given the lowest priority.127  A 
debtor may also write a check hoping that it will not clear before additional 
funds can be put in the bank account.128  Sometimes a merchant or vendor 
will take a postdated check in satisfaction of an obligation.129  The 
                                                 
Media Project:  Loan Sharks Prey on Immigrants, NEW PITTSBURGH COURIER, July 7, 2001, 
at A7 (suggesting that consumers turn to moneylenders because of the absence of formal 
banks in the consumers’ underserved community).  It is not uncommon for immigrants to 
finance their passage to America by borrowing from moneylenders who operate here and 
abroad.  See Peter Kwong, Poverty Despite Family Ties, in THE NEW POVERTY STUDIES:  
THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF POWER, POLITICS, AND IMPOVERISHED PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 
57, 62-67 (Judith Goode & Jeff Maskovsky eds., 2001). 
 125. See Filkins, supra note 124, at A1 (stating that the interest on loans from loan 
sharks accrues at “punishing” and “illegal rates”).  Furthermore, some loan sharks severely 
limit the amount one can borrow.  Id.  One “prestamista” stated in an interview that he does 
not lend more than three-thousand dollars to any one client.  Id. 
 126. See id. (describing that the collection methods of these informal lenders include 
threats and forceful collection of collateral). 
 127. Karen Seccombe, “SO YOU THINK I DRIVE A CADILLAC?”  WELFARE RECIPIENTS’ 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE SYSTEM AND ITS REFORM 114-16 (1999). 
 128. The amount of time it takes for a check to clear may be substantially reduced from a 
matter of days to a matter of hours or minutes because of the Check Clearing for the 21st 
Century Act, known colloquially as the “Check 21 Act.”  See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5001 (2003).  
The Act authorizes the electronic processing of substitute checks, which obviates the delays 
caused by the necessity of physical transporting the originals between banks.  The result of 
Check 21 is likely to be more bounced checks and more overdraft charges for consumers 
counting on the float to give them time to deal with a cash shortage.  See Jennifer A. 
Kingston, Float Time on Check Shortens, as of Today, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2004, at C1; 
Kathy Louise Schuit, Personal Checks Won’t Float for Long under New Rules, 
ALBUQUERQUE (N.M.) J., at A5.  Other customers are likely to be burned as well since the 
law does not require that banks post customers’ deposits more expeditiously.  See Check 
This Out, N.Y. TIMES, OCT. 31, 2004, § 4, at 10 (criticizing the lack of consumer protection 
in the law promoting the electronic processing of checks and calling for a no-hold policy 
regarding checks deposited by customers without a history of problems). 
 129. See GHATE, supra note 61, at 33 (describing the importance of the postdated check 
in obtaining trade credit). 
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“robbery” becomes more literal when the check writer knows that there are 
insufficient funds in her or his account to cover the amount, but writes a 
check anyway with the design of paying both the amount of the check and 
any fees the creditor and the bank might charge for handling an insufficient 
funds draft.  Lacking explicit overdraft protection, the customers thereby 
informally create the equivalent form of credit for themselves.  This 
practice places the check writer at risk of being prosecuted, sued for fraud, 
or blacklisted by mainstream financial institutions.130  However, the fees 
charged by banks for providing bounce protection represent a source of 
significant profit.131  Banks have moved into the vacuum created by the 
informal practice and are extending overdraft protection on a 
“discretionary” basis without prior notice to customers of the substantial 
fees or implicit interest being charged.132 
Some informal measures to generate credit, however, are illegal.  Check-
kiting, of which the defendant accused the plaintiffs in Short Term 
Loans,133 is an illegal activity.  It involves drawing on funds credited to an 
account before the funds have actually been collected.134  “By writing 
checks drawn on two or more out-of-town banks, a person temporarily 
short of cash can write an interest-free unauthorized bank loan or 
temporarily inflate his account balance to improve his chances of getting a 
loan.”135 
                                                 
 130. See Blackford v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 537, 540-44 (S.D. Ga. 1996) 
(denying a claim for malicious prosecution brought by a customer who was arrested even 
though she had covered the bounced check with a money order because she had made a 
practice of paying for merchandise with bad checks); see also Paul Beckett, It’s Not in the 
Mail:  Bounce a Check, and You Might Not Write Another for 5 Years, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 
2000, at A1 (describing the punitive impact on low-income consumers of banks’ reliance on 
the ChexSystems database); Katie Fairbank, Critics Say ChexSystems Errors Hurt 
Consumers, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 16, 2000, at 1D (outlining the criticism of the 
ChexSystems database, noting that it includes only negative information and hurts innocent 
consumers improperly listed and those guilty of only minor infractions).  The ChexSystems 
database collects information on customers who have bounced checks.  Beckett, supra, at 
A1. 
 131. See Owen B. Asplundh, Bounce Protection:  Payday Lending in Sheep’s Clothing?, 
8 N.C. BANKING INST. 349, 353 (2004) (indicating that the banking industry profits an 
estimated $31 billion from overdraft service fees). 
 132. See id. at 356-57 (comparing bounce protection to payday lending with regard to 
compliance with the Truth in Lending Act, state usury caps, and unfair and deceptive trade 
practices laws). 
 133. Smith v. Short Term Loans, L.L.C., No. 99-C1288, 2001 WL 127303, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 14, 2001). 
 134. FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, AN OVERVIEW OF CHECK KITING, at 
http://www.chicafed.org/banking_information/check_kiting.cfm  (last visited on Sept. 17, 
2004) (citing check kiting as “one of the most common” examples of fraud perpetrated by 
bank customers) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 135. THOMAS P. FITCH, DICTIONARY OF BANKING TERMS 87 (3d ed. 1997). 
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E. Subprime Lending as a Combination of the Formal and Informal 
The formal subprime or alternative sector covers a part of the market for 
small personal loans that firms in the primary sector, at one time, did not 
want and left to informal lenders.  Now formal financial institutions are 
buying into or building partnerships with subprime lenders to take 
advantage of the latter’s tremendous profitability.136  To extract profits 
from small-sum loans, payday lenders and other subprime firms combine 
elements of formal lending (standardized contracts, formal fixed locations, 
and resort to legal remedies in the event of default) with elements of 
informal lending (frequent face-to-face transactions, high interests rates for 
short-term loans, and quick approvals) and do-it-yourself credit creation 
(juggling money between several accounts, and writing post-dated 
checks).137  Subprime lenders are able to make a profit in a sector long 
neglected by formal firms because subprimes use relatively cheap but 
powerful computerized credit scoring to determine the creditworthiness of 
their borrowers.138  Moreover, the loans generated are bundled into 
securities and permit the lenders to spread the risk of default.139 
Though subprime lenders claim that their products represent a 
democratization of the formal credit market, their activities might also be 
viewed as a commercialization of what was formerly socially-supported, 
local assistance.  The expansion of formal firms into the informal market 
for small-sum loans suggests that some of the benefits of informal small-
sum lending and charity may be in jeopardy.  From this perspective, the 
firms of the subprime sector are more efficient at parting customers from 
their money than informal lenders because of the subprime entities’ more 
open and aggressive marketing practices and their greater legitimacy to 
customers who would be reluctant to conduct business with some informal 
suppliers of credit.  At the same time, subprime lenders employ informal 
modes of transacting that lull consumers into thinking that the lenders’ 
terms and practices are more benign than they turn out to be.140   
                                                 
 136. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 4 n.14 (describing how banks and payday lenders are 
partnering to take advantage of loopholes in the federal law regulating the banking 
industry).  Banks are “so eager for fee income” that they allow the payday lenders to 
effectively rent their charters.  Id. 
 137. See generally id. (describing how payday lenders disguise the transactions with 
their customers by using a variety of “sham transactions” including fake leasing 
arrangements and purchases). 
 138. See id. at 61 (noting that the use of a credit reporting agency by payday lenders is 
surprising because many of these businesses advertise to the contrary).  The majority of 
payday lenders use Tele-Track, a credit reporting agency that focuses on the subprime 
clientele the lenders seek out.  Id. at 61 n.306. 
 139. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The CRA Implications of Predatory 
Lending, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1571, 1577 (2002) (indicating how banks support subprime 
lenders through purchasing securities backed by such institutions’ loans). 
 140. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 25, 26, 31-33 (criticizing payday lenders for hiding 
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Without effective regulation, formal lenders may not take the important 
social safety net function of small-sum lending into account.  For example, 
distributive justice and anti-discrimination are not as likely to be important 
to commercial firms engaged in extending commercial lending into the 
lowest rungs of the socioeconomic ladder as they might be to nonprofit 
community-based lenders.  Regulation is particularly important to protect 
the poor and near-poor who have trouble meeting their debt service 
obligations, but stand to lose the little wealth they have accumulated 
through the machinations of a predatory credit market. 
It may appear that all victims of predatory lending would benefit from 
greater formality imposed through regulation.  There is a tendency to 
associate formal institutions and formal transacting with more fairness and 
less exploitation.  The light shed on business dealings in the formal, “above 
ground” economy theoretically fosters competition.  Moreover, legal 
regulation constrains overreaching, and mandates disclosures, both of 
which increase the likelihood of transactions that mimic those truly savvy 
consumers would enter into.  But the sort of fairness that competition and 
regulation would produce may not be compatible with the needs or 
preferences of every consumer in the market for a small loan. 
The focus thus far has been on the relative advantages and disadvantages 
of formal and informal lenders and modes of lending.  Yet to be addressed 
are the values and preferences customers bring to credit transactions.  The 
choices that consumers actually make from the panoply of credit 
alternatives laid out above are, by and large, constrained ones.  The 
borrowers’ material circumstances and their access to potential lenders play 
a significant role in the selection, as does the borrowers’ socialization and 
cultural orientation regarding money and personal finance.141  Material 
constraints, of course, tend to shape borrowers’ financial habits.  However, 
consumers familiar with or having a preference for informal modes of 
transacting would seem to be prime targets for firms operating in the 
subprime market.  This is not a coincidence. 
Informal ways of dealing with money are not exclusively an aspect of 
the informal or underground economy; they are also part and parcel of the 
legitimate cash economy which possesses a measure of visibility.  Cash-
basis borrowers and those socialized in the ways of the cash economy bring 
to transactions with subprime sector lenders a set of financial practices, 
                                                 
basic information about their services from their clients).  The lenders make it simple and 
quick for consumers to borrow through them but give false and misleading information 
about the cost of the loan and the credit checking procedures used to approve the consumer 
for the loan.  Id. at 25-26. 
 141. See Rhine & Toussant-Comeau, supra note 64, at 149 (describing the use of 
alternative financial services by households of different socioeconomic classifications). 
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preferences, and perceptions that favor informality in commercial 
transactions.142  Unfortunately, they also reduce the consumers’ vigilance 
with regard to exploitation and overreaching.  The cash economy generates 
a distrust of formal primary sector financial institutions and promotes an 
emphasis on the social nature of commercial transactions.143  Furthermore, 
a cash-basis orientation results in consumers’ underestimating the 
significance of relatively small amounts of money or cash.144  The least 
well-off borrowers who have been the past victims of institutional 
exclusion and economic stereotyping would benefit from credit options that 
did not capitalize on their cash-basis orientation in a way that promotes 
their exploitation.  For them, a true democratization of credit would entail 
liberation from the tyranny of the cash economy, not simply greater access 
to formal credit markets.  These conclusions will be explored in the rest of 
this Article. 
III. THE TYRANNY OF THE CASH ECONOMY 
A. The Social Meaning and Economic Value of Cash 
Depending upon the kind and quantity of assets and resources at its 
disposal, a group of people will develop a set of tastes, preferences, cultural 
understandings, and practices regarding money and personal finance that 
tend to facilitate its achievement of or accommodation to a given place or 
status in society.145  The kind (cultural, social, political, or economic) and 
amount of capital a group possesses roughly determines the habits that the 
group will acquire over time and through practice.146  The habits adopted in 
                                                 
 142. See discussion infra Part III.B (describing the deeply embedded cultural values that 
give rise to the preferences of those operating in the cash economy). 
 143. See discussion infra Part III.B (suggesting that participants in the cash economy feel 
alienated from the mainstream financial world). 
 144. See discussion infra Part III.A (describing the low social value of cash and the 
stigma attached to large amounts of cash). 
 145. This discussion relies heavily on sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. 
PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION:  A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE 169-75 
(Richard Nice trans., 1984) (1979).  Bourdieu refers to the practices and preferences of a 
group with regard to a particular area of endeavor like personal finance and economics as its 
“habitus.”  Id.  According to Bourdieu, a “habitus is necessity internalized and converted 
into a disposition that generates meaningful practices and meaning-giving perceptions.”  Id. 
at 170.  A habitus is the relationship between the “capacity to produce classifiable practices 
and works, and the capacity to differentiate and appreciate these practices and products 
(taste).”  Id.  See also Alan Aldridge, Habitus and Cultural Capital in the Field of Personal 
Finance, 46 SOC. REV. 1, 12-21 (1998), for an application of Bourdieu’s theories to the field 
of personal finance and an argument that product design and marketing compensate for 
consumers’ lack of cultural and social capital in the field. 
 146. In Bourdieu’s topology, capital is not limited to the economic.  See BOURDIEU, 
supra note 145, at 114-15 (describing class differences as the product of different sets of the 
various types of capital, including cultural, social, and economic).  Indeed, “capital” can be 
any “accumulated assets, resources, sources of strength, or advantages.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD 
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one area (such as personal finance) will bear an affinity to habits embraced 
in other fields of endeavor (such as work, leisure, home furnishings, and 
food consumption).  The sum total of these habits will essentially generate 
a lifestyle by which the group classifies itself and is classified by others.147 
The form of money to which a group has access has substantial bearing 
on the financial preferences and practices the group takes up.148  There are 
many forms of money circulating in our economy—cash, checks, credit 
cards, debit cards, ATM cards, smart cards, and cybermoney.  They vary 
with regard to their sophistication, the distances and speed with which they 
travel, the amount transactions typically involved, and the formality of the 
                                                 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 332 (Philip Babcock Gove et al. eds., 1993).  Non-
economic forms of capital, such as cultural, social, political, or symbolic capital, may be 
converted into economic capital although they are created through autonomous processes 
that are not dependent on economic capital.  Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 241, 243 (John 
G. Richardson ed., 1986). 
Cultural capital includes habits of style, taste, manners, social competence or confidence, 
and self-assurance, as well as the institutional mechanisms to define and to legitimate the 
values and standards on which all sorts of qualitative assessments of social distinction are 
drawn.  See generally BOURDIEU, supra note 145.  Cultural capital is produced by 
socialization and education.  See id. at 80-96 (exploring the relationship between 
educational capital and cultural capital that is inherited).  For example, the cultural capital 
imparted to the children of the petite bourgeoisie includes an understanding and appreciation 
of the values and practices of entrepreneurship and money management.  See, e.g., IVAN 
LIGHT & STEVEN J. GOLD, ETHNIC ECONOMIES 92-93 (2000).  This gives the offspring of the 
petite bourgeoisie the tools with which the class can reproduce itself.  Id. 
Unlike human capital, which rather directly increases a person’s productivity, cultural 
capital’s relationship to economic well-being is more attenuated.  Cultural capital generates 
prestige and recognition which can lead to advantageous employment, marriages, and 
business contacts which in turn can translate into material wealth.  Id. at 91.   
Social capital, on the other hand, is “a capital of social connections, honourability [sic] 
and respectability.”  BOURDIEU, supra note 145, at 122.  It is created by social networks and 
sustained by exchanges, mutual obligations, and shared identities that in essence pay off in 
terms of support and access to resources.  LIGHT & GOLD, supra, at 110-11.  “Denoting the 
web of connections, loyalties, and mutual obligations (shared fate, solidarity, and communal 
membership) that develop among people as part of their regular interaction, social capital 
refers to the sense of commitment that induces people to extend favors, expect preferential 
treatment, and look out for one another’s interests.”  Id. at 110. 
Social capital is a much debated and contentious concept in the social sciences.  See, e.g., 
Alejandro Portes, Social Capital:  Its Origins and Application in Modern Sociology, 24 
ANN. REV. SOC. 1, 3, 21 (1998) (reviewing the spectrum of writing on the subject of social 
capital and its importance in discourse on “public civicness [sic]”).  Portes argues that the 
negative consequences of social capital are often overlooked.  Id. at 15-18, 21-22.  “Social 
ties can bring about greater control over wayward behavior and provide privileged access to 
resources; they can also restrict individual freedoms and bar outsiders from gaining access 
to the same resources through particularistic preference.”  Id. at 21.  Moreover, groups, in 
addition to individuals, may possess social capital.  Id. at 18-21.  Racial/ethnic and feminist 
solidarity or group identification are forms of group social capital.  Id. at 9.  According to 
Portes, however, there is a tendency on the part of some scholars to view social capital as a 
panacea that will cure the ills of unorganized poor and socially or politically marginalized 
communities.  Id.  Social capital may be evidence of the existence of civic virtue and social 
integration in a community and not its cause.  Id. at 19-21. 
 147. BOURDIEU, supra note 145, at 172-73. 
 148. Id. at 173. 
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transactions in which they are employed.  Imagine, if you will, $1, $1,000, 
$100,000, and $1,000,000 in each form of money listed above.  The 
amounts might be equivalent, but the social and economic value or 
significance of the amounts certainly differs.  It follows that the form of 
money in which an individual or a group commonly conducts commercial 
transactions both reflects and constructs its social standing.  The lower the 
economic wealth or earnings of a person or group, the more primitive the 
form of money in which the person or group transacts business and the 
more expensive those transactions tend to be.149  Individuals and groups 
possessing limited amounts of money or money of a lower social value 
tend to adopt more simplistic modes of transacting business or engaging in 
commercial dealings.150  Furthermore, the kind of money they have at their 
disposal also determines how they value money and their attitudes toward 
money.151 
In terms of social value, cash is the least sophisticated, least efficient, 
and least productive form of money.  When we think of cash, we envision 
small amounts of money that will fit into a wallet, a cookie jar, the opening 
in a mattress, or a passbook savings account.  When we think of cash in 
large amounts, we envision stacks of bills that have been illegally obtained 
or accumulated in the criminal or underground economies and that must be 
laundered or destigmatized.  Cash is meant to be spent or saved; it is 
largely a tool of consumption, not an instrument of investment.  If one has 
money and does not know what to do with it, it might as well be cash.  The 
requirement that cash transactions of $10,000 or more be reported to the 
Treasury Department has burned into the popular imagination the tie 
between cash and crime.152  This requirement, which was directed at 
exposing criminal activity, reduces cash’s currency or capacity to circulate 
as a medium of exchange and accordingly its value.  The decrease in 
                                                 
 149. JACK WEATHERFORD, THE HISTORY OF MONEY:  FROM SANDSTONE TO CYBERSPACE 
249 (1997).  See generally JAN PAHL, INVISIBLE MONEY:  FAMILY FINANCES IN THE 
ELECTRONIC ECONOMY (1999) (reporting on the results of a qualitative study involving 
thousands of British families which revealed that the form of money used (cash, cheques, 
credit cards, debit cards, smart cards, loyalty cards) varied with the gender, income, and 
employment status of the individual family member in such a way that husbands and wives 
had access to different amounts of money and potentially different standards of living). 
 150. See PAHL, supra note 149, at vii-viii (indicating that middle income groups tend to 
use forms of money that are passed over by high income groups and may be unavailable to 
low income groups). 
 151. See id. at viii (indicating that low income groups may respond to credit in different 
ways, either in a carefree manner or with greater anxiety than more affluent groups). 
 152. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-53 (1994).  See generally United 
States v. One Lot of United States Currency Totaling $14,665, 33 F. Supp. 2d 47, 49 (D. 
Mass. 1998) (denying forfeiture under drug laws of a large sum of cash in small bills, 
wrapped in rubber bands, seized from a young Hispanic man stopped by airport security).  
The man claimed that he had cash because he was having trouble with his bank and intended 
to use the funds for a down payment on a home in his destination.  Id. at 50-51. 
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efficacy impacts large amounts of cash that are lawfully acquired, even if 
they are too small to trigger the reporting requirement.  This particularly 
affects the money of working class people whose savings take the form of 
cash because they distrust or do not understand financial institutions.153 
B. The Cultural Orientation of Cash-Basis Consumers 
We know a bit about the practices and preferences of poorer minority 
consumers who do most of their commercial transactions with cash.  Such 
consumers are confined to inferior markets not only for goods and services 
but also for money and credit.  As a result of institutional exclusion, they 
have developed several noteworthy predilections.  First, they favor face-to-
face cash transactions over those involving greater anonymity and less 
tangible forms of money.  Second, they have limited involvement with 
mainstream financial institutions whose accounts are not tailored to meet 
their needs and whose fee structures they particularly distrust.  Third, they 
experience a sense of powerlessness and alienation where financial matters 
are concerned. 
The black poor’s penchant for cash is revealed by a study conducted by 
economist John Caskey of the financial practices of eighteen low-to-
moderate-income blacks in a small town in northeastern Mississippi.154  
Caskey found that many of his informants preferred to operate on what he 
termed a “cash-and-carry basis.”155  They cashed their pay or benefit 
checks, paid their bills, and carried the remainder in the form of cash until 
the next pay or benefits day.156  They felt that they had more control over 
their money if they kept it in cash rather than put it in the bank.157  It was 
easier for them to physically count their money than it was to keep track of 
it mentally or to balance a check book.158  They also found banks slow in 
crediting deposits to their accounts.159  Of course, there is a downside to 
                                                 
 153. A Milwaukee consumer credit activist made this point in describing continuing 
barriers to credit; she stated that “some lenders still question where a minority could get 
money for a downpayment particularly when it is in cash . . . [I]n her culture (she is a 
Latina) some Mexicans do not trust banks.  So they keep money at home ‘in coffee cans.’”  
GREGORY D. SQUIRES & SALLY O’CONNOR, COLOR AND MONEY:  POLITICS AND PROSPECTS 
FOR COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT IN URBAN AMERICA 20 (2001).  In her view, though, 
lenders were increasingly finding such “mattress money” to be acceptable.  Id.; see also 
Hastick, supra note 79, at 123, 129 (describing how susu or ROSCA funds are being 
accepted as down payments when supported with documentation and how susu participation 
is being taken as evidence of creditworthiness). 
 154. JOHN P. CASKEY, BEYOND CASH-AND-CARRY:  FINANCIAL SAVINGS, FINANCIAL 
SERVICES, AND LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS IN TWO COMMUNITIES ii (Report to the Consumer 
Federation of American and the Ford Foundation, Dec. 1997). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 15. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 17. 
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cash-and-carry.  Protecting one’s cash from burglars and thieves is a 
concern in some households and communities. 160  Moreover, budgeting 
may be difficult.161  Accounting for expenditures is harder, and people are 
more cavalier about redirecting or reallocating cash from one purpose to 
another, as opposed to money in the bank.162  The timing of receipt of the 
cash and the due date for the payment of obligations may not coincide; 
maintaining cash in hand to meet future obligations may be difficult.163  
Finally, cash does not earn interest like money in a savings account. 
For many poorer consumers, the “choice” of a cash-and-carry existence 
makes good sense given the unsatisfactory alternatives (checking accounts, 
savings accounts, ATM cards).  Caskey found that people who did not have 
bank accounts had little in the way of savings, could not satisfy the 
minimum balance requirement, and found the monthly maintenance fees 
problematic.164  Losing money through bank fees and charges is a source of 
anxiety that makes lower income consumers wary of banks and other 
deposit institutions.165  ATM cards attached to checking accounts also raise 
worries.  It is easy to lose track of one’s balance and to bounce checks as a 
result.  Moreover, using the ATM of a bank other than one’s own is 
expensive.  Finally, someone might steal the ATM card and wipe out the 
depositor’s balance.166 
Responding to the inadequacies of prime sector institutions and catering 
to the preferences of customers socialized in the ways of the cash economy, 
subprime firms offer financial services that make them the institutions of 
choice even for some borrowers who actually have alternatives.  Among 
the features that customers find desirable are better locations and more 
favorable operating hours than top-tier firms;167 less stringent risk-
                                                 
 160. LINDA F. ALWITT & THOMAS D. DONLEY, THE LOW-INCOME CONSUMER:  ADJUSTING 
THE BALANCE OF EXCHANGE 97 (1996). 
 161. See id. (explaining that people divert cash from their original purpose to 
extracurricular activities with few or no problems). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. JOHN P. CASKEY, LOWER INCOME AMERICANS, HIGHER COST FINANCIAL SERVICES 21 
(Report for The Center for Credit Union Research and The Filene Research Institute, 1997).  
Loss of privacy and the fear of having money attached to satisfy a judgment for debt or 
child support have also been cited as explanations by those lacking transaction accounts.  
Jeanne M. Hogarth & Kevin H. O’Connell, Banking Relationships of Lower-Income 
Families and the Governmental Trend Toward Electronic Payment, 85 FED. RES. BULL. 459, 
463 (1999). 
 165. Cathleen M. Finn et al., Assets and Financial Management Among Poor 
Households in Extreme Poverty Neighborhoods, J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE, Dec. 1994, at 75, 
84. 
 166. CASKEY, supra note 164, at 18-19. 
 167. See SQUIRES & O’CONNOR, supra note 153, at 153-56 (indicating that a survey 
conducted in Milwaukee’s Community Development Block Grant neighborhoods revealed 
that, while the banks were open forty-four hours per week, including 2.7 hours on the 
weekend and 0.5 hours in the evening, the check cashing businesses were open sixty-eight 
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screening procedures;168 and swifter approvals.169  All of these factors 
increase the cost of the credit.  Limited credit evaluations and the cash 
basis on which the firms conduct business reduce the paper trail and limit 
intrusions into the customers’ privacy.  The firms, for their part, insure their 
profitability by delivering narrowly specialized services, concentrating 
their marketing efforts on attracting prior users, scheduling payments to 
coincide with the customer’s cash flow to assure that they will be paid 
before the customer has a chance to spend the money, structuring the deals 
to facilitate the transfer of collateral, monitoring payments closely, and 
responding to nonpayment swiftly and aggressively.170   
The lenders’ informal operations are deceptive.  Many are corporate 
entities connected to larger banks and financial institutions.  As one 
commentator noted regarding a check-cashing outlet in a Washington, D.C. 
neighborhood, “[t]he primitive hands-on processing and tawdry exterior of 
the outlets both exude welcome to poor customers and mask [the firm’s] 
close ties to and substantial financing from large corporations and big 
banks, as well as the fact that it is part of a large corporate chain.”171  The 
firms’ chief advantage, of course, may be that their customers are unaware 
of the greater expenses entailed in the frequent small payments such firms 
require over an extended period of time.172  This myopia is a result of a 
cash-basis orientation. 
It is significant to consumers that firms in the alternative sector tend to 
operate on a cash-basis.  Poorer consumers are most comfortable 
transacting with cash.  Cash fosters intimate or personal social relations.  
Handling cash and exchanging it with others creates social connections that 
are a significant aspect of their lifestyle.173  Cash is tangible evidence of 
one’s contribution to one’s family and community, and to the economy in 
general; direct deposit schemes that eliminate the need for face-to-face 
transacting do not have the same testimonial impact.  Going to the check 
                                                 
hours per week, including 13.1 hours on the weekend and 2.5 hours in the evening making 
such firms more attractive for customers despite their holding accounts at other institutions). 
 168. CASKEY, supra note 164, at 19.  In lieu of formal credit reports, these institutions 
may rely on the word of community references or trade information among themselves.  Id. 
at 33. 
 169. Id.  These include friendly personal service, informal settings, and faster approval.  
Also, all transactions are in cash which does not leave a paper or an electronic trail.  Id. at 
23, 52-53. 
 170. Id. at 51-52. 
 171. Brett Williams, What’s Debt Got to Do with It?, in THE NEW POVERTY STUDIES:  
THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF POWER, POLITICS, AND IMPOVERISHED PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 
79, 87 (Judith Goode & Jeff Maskovsky eds., 2001). 
 172. CASKEY, supra note 164, at 19, 53. 
 173. See TAD CRAWFORD, THE SECRET LIFE OF MONEY:  TEACHING TALES OF SPENDING, 
RECEIVING, SAVING, AND OWNING 221 (1994) (finding in tangible money a connection to 
other people and the divine, as well as a sign of “what is fertile in our world and in 
ourselves”). 
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casher or dropping into the rent-to-own store represents a social occasion.  
“Fictive friendships” between customers and staff bring the customers back 
again and again.174  The cash economy is ideal for people with more time 
than money, or to put it more crassly, for people whose time is not worth 
much on the labor market. 
The resort of poorer consumers to the firms of the alternative market is 
consistent with reports that they feel manipulated, angry, powerless, and 
alienated when it comes to dealing with financial institutions.175  This 
leaves them susceptible to manipulation and abuse.176  Snubbed by the 
primary sector, some poorer consumers are more pride-conscious than 
price-conscious and are therefore susceptible to the appeal of the secondary 
sector’s “merchandising of respect.”177  Though there is minimal difference 
between the “merchandising of respect” and the “marketing of relationship 
banking” which is directed at the more desirable consumers of top tier 
services, the latter start out with more choices.178  Moreover, because 
poorer consumers generally possess limited financial literacy and tend to 
simplify or ignore incongruous details where the overall terms of the 
transaction are likely to be unfavorable,179 they often have little 
understanding of the contracts they sign.180  They are more concerned with 
whether their periodic payments are manageable than with the actual 
interest rate charged.  But their options are limited and doing business with 
the institutions of the subprime market may offer these consumers “their 
only opportunity to enjoy the consumer fruits of the longest economic 
expansion in American history.”181 
                                                 
 174. See Ramsey, supra note 9, at 188 (indicating that sales techniques and patterns of 
social power distribution rather than the socio-economic risk factors become the primary 
cause of higher prices in lower income markets). 
 175. See ALWITT & DONLEY, supra note 160, at 67 (describing how poor people perceive 
themselves and their financial position particularly with respect to outside aid and 
assistance); see also Ronald Paul Hill & Debra Lynn Stephens, Impoverished Consumers 
and Consumer Behavior:  The Case of AFDC Mothers, J. MACROMARKETING, Fall 1997, at 
32, 34, 40-41 (finding that female welfare recipients experience a loss of control and 
feelings of alienation and humiliation when their position is exposed through the use of 
stigmatized forms of money such as food stamps and vouchers). 
 176. ALWITT & DONLEY, supra note 160, at 69. 
 177. ROBERT C. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION:  THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S 
ADDICTION TO CREDIT 200-02 (2000).  See generally Hill & Stephens, supra note 175, at 41 
(relating the consequences of social stigmatization of lower income individuals). 
 178. MANNING, supra note 177, at 202. 
 179. ALWITT & THOMAS D. DONLEY, supra note 160, at 120. 
 180. See Ronald P. Hill et al., The Rent-to-Own Industry and Pricing Disclosure Tactics, 
17 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 3, 4-6 (1998) (explaining the difficulty that some consumers 
have in understanding the intricacies of rent-to-own contracts and the higher prices of such 
contracts versus the direct purchase of the goods from first-tier retailers). 
 181. MANNING, supra note 177, at 209. 
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C. The Association Between Blacks and Cash 
The habits and assumptions of poorer minority consumers described 
above are not necessarily shared by all of those who use check cashers or 
take out payday loans.  Payday loan customers are certainly not among the 
poorest consumers of financial services because they must have checking 
accounts even to be eligible for a loan.182  The habits learned in the cash 
economy though may outlive the material conditions that gave birth to 
them if institutional exclusion persists or if the social and cultural capital 
required to support a more sophisticated orientation to credit and money are 
not allowed to develop.   
For example, black people in general tend to be associated with cash.183  
This is a legacy of their historic exclusion from full participation in the 
economy.184  Blacks have long been stereotyped as being “impulsive, fun-
loving, indulgent, and wasteful consumers”185 “who could not have money 
without spending it immediately.”186  Blacks are accordingly assumed not 
to know the value of money or how to deal with financial matters in a 
knowledgeable way.  Such notions about blacks and their money facilitate 
efforts to confine their commercial transactions to the cash economy.  
Moreover, the association between blacks and cash makes it more difficult 
for blacks to establish credibility and trust with regard to transactions 
involving substantial sums of money or necessitating credit.  Credit is thus 
harder for them to obtain.187  Conversely, it is easier for others to negotiate 
or bargain successfully with blacks if black people’s money is treated like 
cash or its equivalents.  The money would obviously be put to a better, 
                                                 
 182. See Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 123 (2004) 
(describing payday loan consumers as “underbanked” because they lack the knowledge to 
avoid subprime or fringe credit). 
 183. See Sheila D. Ards & Samuel L. Myers, Jr., The Color of Money:  Bad Credit, 
Wealth, and Race, 45 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 223, 224 (2001) (describing that a “common 
misconception within the social science community” regarding the cause of lower incomes, 
home ownership rates, access to credit, and higher credit denial rates of African Americans 
is attributable solely to poor credit). 
 184. See Ards & Myers, Jr., supra note 183, at 227-28, 233 (noting that blacks have 
historically been denied credit because lenders deem them untrustworthy).  The exclusion of 
blacks has led to “an environment of poor credit habits” for blacks.  Id. 
 185. TED OWNBY, AMERICAN DREAMS IN MISSISSIPPI:  CONSUMERS, POVERTY & CULTURE 
1830-1998 4-5 (1999). 
 186. Id. at 5. 
 187. See generally Austin, supra note 1 (arguing that the social conceptualization of 
“black people’s money” in terms of the quality (mostly cash) and quantity of funds available 
to black negatively impacts their ability to obtain credit); see also Regina Austin, “A Nation 
of Thieves:”  Securing Black People’s Right to Shop and to Sell in White America, 1994 
UTAH L. REV. 147, 149 (describing difficulties blacks encounter in making purchases with 
checks); Ards & Myers, Jr., supra note 183, at 225 (arguing that the erroneous perception 
that blacks have poor credit limits their access to loans).  But see Ards & Myers, Jr., id., at 
234 (discussing research that suggests that blacks have less difficulty obtaining credit cards 
than maintaining good credit). 
AUSTIN.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 1/17/2005  11:17:48 AM 
2004] PREDATORY LENDING AND CREDIT DEMOCRATIZATION 1251 
higher use in the hands of a nonblack person who can amass it and turn it 
into capital.  Add to this the impact of the association between blacks and 
crime or dishonesty188 and it becomes clear why black people’s money is 
treated as tainted, and, as with a fetish subject to a taboo, is considered 
sanitized or restored to full value only when it passes into the hands of 
whites.189 
If the notion that discrimination inheres in the very way we think about 
black people’s money is unconvincing, the subject might be approached in 
terms of general racist stereotyping.  A belief in black intellectual 
inferiority makes investments in black people, their property, and their 
communities seem riskier than comparable investments in whites.190  A 
belief that black borrowers are stupid or incompetent will lead to more 
refusals to lend, higher interest rates, demands for more information, and 
higher transaction costs in credit transactions involving blacks.191  Some 
blacks have internalized these notions.192  Others have accommodated their 
financial practices and preferences to them.193  Fear of being denied credit, 
for example, drives some creditworthy blacks to seek loans in the fringe or 
subprime sector where they receive money on less favorable terms than 
comparably situated whites.194  Yet a third group has eschewed full 
participation in the market for financial services.195  It does not matter; 
through any of these responses, the economic subjugation of a substantial 
number of blacks is assured. 
Blacks’ exclusion from full participation in the market for financial 
services is a byproduct of their historical confinement to the cash economy.  
That exclusion and confinement have produced, via socialization, patterns 
of financial behavior that facilitate the continued economic marginalization 
of black people.  The cash-basis orientation is cultural.  Culture is created 
by, as well as being manifested in, the workings of families, communities, 
                                                 
 188.  See Austin, supra note 1 (exploring the impact of stereotypes linking blacks to 
crime in lowering the social and material value of their money); see also Austin, supra note 
187, at 151-52 (noting that those tasked with security surveillance in retail establishments 
engage in racial profiling under the assumption that the majority of lawbreakers are black); 
Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1952-54 (1993) 
(noting that race is not only used to identify criminals but also the crimes they commit). 
 189. See generally Austin, supra note 1 (propounding a cultural theory of black people’s 
money as being the equivalent of a fetish subject to a taboo). 
 190. MARCELLUS ANDREWS, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HOPE AND FEAR:  CAPITALISM 
AND THE BLACK CONDITION IN AMERICA 77 (1999). 
 191. Id. at 77-78. 
 192. Ards & Myers, Jr., supra note 183, at 238. 
 193. See id. at 229 (noting that blacks, excluded from prime credit opportunities, have 
historically resorted to increased savings behavior). 
 194. Id. at 229-30, 238. 
 195. See id. at 233-34 (discussing focus group research that observed the common lack 
of participation in credit and lending among blacks, especially with regard to merchant 
credit cards). 
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markets, and governments.  Of course, impoverished material conditions 
spawn an impoverished or impoverishing culture.  Both material conditions 
and the culture must change for the cycle to be broken. 
D. Ending the Tyranny of the Cash Economy 
Small-sum borrowers who deal with predatory lenders should not be 
viewed as totally “cash-dazzled, payment-myopic borrower[s].”196  A wad 
of borrowed cash does not cause them to forget where the money is coming 
from and how much it is costing them.  They are not overcome by an 
immediate urge to spend because they suddenly have cash in hand.  
Moreover, their cash-basis orientation and the preference for informality 
that it generates would appear to have some positive aspects from the 
perspective of the borrowers.  For example, focusing solely on consumer 
abuse tends to underestimate the benefits of the expanded credit offered by 
firms in the alternative market.  Purchasers who shop at rent-to-own stores, 
for example, pay several times the cost of an item, but rent-to-own stores 
may provide them with their only opportunity to participate in consumer 
culture by obtaining access to products that nearly everyone else enjoys.  
Moreover, flexibility is a valuable attribute of rent-to-own contracts; the 
purchaser can walk away from the debt at any time.197 
The important point here is that cash-basis consumers and those 
socialized in the ways of the cash economy possess certain constraints and 
certain mindsets and habits that affect their ability to negotiate successfully 
in the market for credit, especially the sector populated by subprime 
lenders.  A possible solution to their woes lies in either increasing their 
access to financial services supplied by firms in the primary sector or 
regulating the subprime sector to produce behavior more like that exhibited 
by firms in the primary sector.  Breaking the hold of the tyranny of the 
values of the cash economy through consumer education and exposure to 
alternatives might also facilitate their economic well-being.  There is a 
further possibility:  expanding small-sum borrowers’ credit options by 
taking into account their preferences, infusing the values of informality into 
the notion of the democratization of credit (a concept that the lenders like 
to invoke), and creating new hybrid sources of credit that deliver a better 
mix of  the advantages of the formal and the informal. 
                                                 
 196. PETERSON, supra note 14, at 171. 
 197. See generally Brian J. Zikmun-Fisher & Andrew M. Parker, Demand for Rent-to-
Own Contracts:  A Behavorial Economic Explanation, 38 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 199 
(1999) (discussing escapability and structured payments as factors explaining households’ 
use of rent-to-own transactions); Hill et al., supra note 180, at 6-8 (noting that accessibility 
of retailers and terminability of contracts are seen as benefits of shopping at rent-to-own 
retailers). 
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As the next section makes clear, the benefits of informality are not 
limited to fast approvals and face-to-face contracting.  The benefits of 
informality also include the embeddedness of the lender in the local 
community and in the social relationships that promote financial decisions 
which acknowledge the value of the reciprocity of respect and 
responsibility; flexibility (as to lender structure and the mode of 
transacting) that compensates for and corrects, rather than exploits, the 
borrowers’ lack of financial sophistication; and involvement of creditors or 
intermediaries representing debtors in activities that link borrowing for 
consumption to the generation and control of income and wealth for and by 
the community and its citizen-consumers.   
IV. REINTERPRETING THE “DEMOCRATIZATION OF CREDIT” TO INCLUDE 
THE INFORMAL 
Firms in the subprime or fringe credit market assert that they are 
promoting the democratization of credit.198  This, however, is a disputable 
proposition.  At a minimum, the democratization of credit should provide 
“credit-constrained” consumers with “access to previously unavailable 
credit on more competitive and attractive terms.”199  The industry’s critics 
charge that the credit being offered by subprime lenders is “destructive,” 
not “productive,” and therefore not consistent with the democratization of 
credit as properly understood.200 
The concept of the “democratization of credit” is not new.201  
Regrettably, its contemporary manifestation departs from the ideals with 
                                                 
 198. See, e.g., Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Predatory Mortgage Lending:  Summary of 
Legislative and Regulatory Activity, Including Testimony on Subprime Mortgage Lending 
Before the House Banking Committee, 1242 PRACTICING L. INST. 9, 40 (2001) (recounting 
testimony before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Banking and 
Financial Services that the subprime home equity market has not met the needs of low-
income and minority borrowers). 
 199. Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 98 (2000) 
(noting the increased use of credit cards over other forms of short term borrowing). 
 200. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 6, at 665; see also Mansfield, supra note 198, at 41. 
 201. For example, an article in the April 1914 issue of the journal, Current Opinion, 
linked the democratization of credit in America to the creation of formal institutions and 
instruments like savings banks or Morris Plans, which extended money to honest working 
“people of little means” or “men of small, if not the smallest, account financially . . . on 
terms virtually as easy and as dignified as those on which the man of property borrows 
money at an ordinary commercial bank.”  The Democratization of Credit, CURRENT 
OPINION, Apr. 1914, at 313-14.  Democratized credit, a phenomenon already a half century 
old in Europe at this point, was a device for thwarting predatory, informal loan-sharking.  
Id. at 314-15.  Under the Morris Plans, a borrower needed two responsible persons to 
endorse the transaction and to guarantee the repayment of the loan.  CHARLES CORZELLE, 
THE SMALL LOAN RACKETT 20 (1934).  This requirement “discourage[d] promiscuous and 
habitual borrowing.”  Id. at 21.  Furthermore, repayment could be made in installments.  Id. 
at 20.  The interest was assessed when the loan was made, which “prevented the charging of 
high interest when loans were not repaid upon the due date.”  Id. 
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which the term was originally associated.  An analysis of the grassroots 
campaign waged by the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) in 
the 1970s to obtain access to store credit for its members provides a good 
illustration of this.202  Though the material benefits generated by the 
NWRO campaign were local and sporadic, it nonetheless achieved an 
important symbolic victory.203  The NWRO conceptualized consumer credit 
as “a right of American citizenship.”204  The welfare mothers it represented 
wanted to be treated like anyone else; to them buying with credit should 
have been “normal” even for welfare recipients.205  In its quest for credit, 
the NWRO targeted low-end retailers including Sears, Montgomery Ward, 
and Lerner Shops, and local department stores like Wanamaker’s and 
Filene’s.206  It sought credit from large merchants so that welfare mothers 
could bypass small local or neighborhood merchants who charged high 
prices and delivered poor quality goods.207  As a feature of its national 
campaign, the NWRO proposed that local chapters would serve as informal 
credit intermediaries between merchants and its members for whom the 
NWRO would supply letters of reference that would suffice as proof of the 
applicants’ creditworthiness.208 
The goals of the NWRO credit campaign were not limited to the 
economic.  “[I]n advocating that poor people had the right to credit—even 
if it meant risking debt—welfare rights activists distinguished themselves 
from the more paternalistic experts dedicated to safeguarding low-income 
consumers from exploitative retailers as well as their own appetites as 
consumers.”209  According to historian Felicia Kornbluh, “for middle and 
working class people, access to credit (and the denial of credit to others) 
was part of their sense of respectability.  When NWRO members 
demanded Sears credit cards they asked to be included among the 
respectable.”210  Moreover, the “[w]elfare rights activists saw themselves as 
entitled to credit because they were entitled to social recognition [as 
                                                 
 202. See generally Felicia Kornbluh, Black Buying Power:  Welfare Rights, 
Consumerism, and Northern Protest, in FREEDOM NORTH:  BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLES 
OUTSIDE THE SOUTH, 1940-1980 199 (Jeanne Theoharis & Komozi Woodward eds., 2003).  
The activists of the NWRO resorted to traditional movement tactics like leafleting, business-
disrupting shop-ins, and credit card burning by wealthier supporters to support their claims 
for credit.  Id. at 207. 
 203. Id. at 205-08. 
 204. Id. at 210. 
 205. Id. at 209. 
 206. Id. at 205-06. 
 207. Id. at 205. 
 208. Id. at 206. 
 209. LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC:  THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION 
IN POSTWAR AMERICA 381 (2003). 
 210. Kornbluh, supra note 202, at 209. 
AUSTIN.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 1/17/2005  11:17:48 AM 
2004] PREDATORY LENDING AND CREDIT DEMOCRATIZATION 1255 
women and mothers] in a consumer society.”211  The campaign for credit 
expressed their “deep yearning for social inclusion in post-war society.”212 
The democratization of credit is generally spoken of in terms of uplift 
and advancement, or so it should be.  It calls for an infusion of democratic 
values into the private market and a broader sharing of the benefits of the 
society’s economic endowments by a wider spectrum of consumers.  This 
is one of the reasons why access to credit is considered part of the social 
safety net.  Ideally, democratized credit should leave those who use it in a 
better position to negotiate the formal market and to improve their ability to 
save, acquire assets, invest, and otherwise amass wealth. 
The democratization of credit is an essential component of a modern 
economic regime.  It is required to produce citizens who are economically 
modern.  “[S]kills in money management and access, plus knowledge of 
financial products and systems, are fast becoming part of a necessary 
financial literacy essential for full social participation and survival.”213  The 
democratization of credit should accordingly dismantle or challenge 
economic stereotypes and make access to money easier for groups whose 
lack of creditworthiness stems from past racial and gender discrimination 
in the allocation of material resources. 
Payday loans, for example, as we have seen, are not an assured 
mechanism for lifting borrowers above the disadvantages of the informal 
devices they would otherwise employ to deal with debt; moreover, payday 
loans seem to add to borrowers’ troubles the disadvantages of formal 
lending.  Payday loans simply do not guarantee that borrowers can advance 
to the next level of financial advantage, security, or sophistication.  Rather, 
they too often exacerbate borrowers’ desperation and economic 
marginality, and exploit borrowers’ sometimes rudimentary or simplistic 
orientation to money and credit.  Those debtors who successfully satisfy 
their obligations under payday loans do not even get credit for their 
reliability, as their success in extinguishing their debts is not reflected on 
their credit records.  This fact stems from the informal nature of payday 
borrowing.214 
                                                 
 211. Id. at 211. 
 212. Id. at 214. 
 213. Ruth Pearson, Micro-credit as a Path from Welfare to Work:  The Experience of the 
Full Circle Project, UK, in WOMEN AND CREDIT, supra note 76, at 167, 175. Jones & Sakyi-
Dawson, supra note 76, at 167, 175 (emphasis deleted). 
 214. See Richard Brooks, Credit Where It’s Due, FORBES, Apr. 12, 2004, at 52 (arguing 
that payday lenders deny their customers “access to the traditional credit markets” by not 
reporting favorable dispositions of their debts which would allow the borrowers to build a 
positive credit history).  But see Michelle Singletary, Earning Credit for Paying Rent, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2004, at F1 (describing Pay Rent, Build Credit, Inc., a credit bureau 
that allows consumers to build a credit history based on the timely payment of obligations 
like rent and utility bills). 
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If the democratization of credit were truly the goal, the reform agenda 
would extend beyond usury regulation and suitability requirements.  It 
would include alternatives that acknowledge the orientations that 
consumers bring to financial transactions and work to change them by 
drawing upon what is positive about them.  Black people’s exclusion from 
full participation in the financial services market has resulted in the absence 
of the material conditions that give rise to and sustain the cultural and 
social capital needed to facilitate greater financial literacy, sophistication, 
and security among blacks of all classes.215  Many poor and/or minority 
communities lack access to reliable and trustworthy formal external sources 
of credit, information, and expertise and are accordingly vulnerable to 
overreaching, underdevelopment, and depreciation of the value of their 
money.  This is not the result of their choice or their deficiencies, but rather 
a consequence of the material conditions in which they acquired their 
financial habits.  Promoting savings and strengthening pro-debtor sources 
of credit that preserve the benefits of informality would reduce the demand 
for credit from formal entities like payday lenders and car title 
pawnbrokers.  Linking formal sector firms with informal local 
intermediaries would allow the firms to achieve greater penetration in 
minority markets and give borrowers the benefit of knowledgeable sources 
of protection.216  The poor and working class might benefit from 
“innovative lending schemes that use community monitoring and 
enforcement to mimic the [benefits and advantages of the] informal lending 
sector.”217  Of course, the market for credit, like many other commodities, 
cannot truly be democratized without changing existing power relations, 
particularly with regard to production.218  The local financial intermediaries 
might prove useful in pursuing 
a strategy of coalition building that enables those on the economic or 
social margins to strike an enforceable bargain with better-off economic 
players.  Such bargains exchange the untapped resources and ability of 
marginal consumers or workers for the means needed to develop their 
productivity and a safety net that makes sustained participation 
possible.219 
Cultural mechanisms need to be fostered to encourage consumers 
socialized in the ways of the cash economy to think of their money as being 
                                                 
 215. ANDREWS, supra note 190, at 3. 
 216. Jones & Sakyi-Dawson, supra note 76, at 167, 175. 
 217. BOND & TOWNSEND, supra note 94, at 19. 
 218. See COHEN, supra note 209, at 309 (noting that, although advertisers and marketers 
began to recognize diversity and segment the market in the 1960s and 1970s, leading to 
market democratization, ownership remained concentrated in large manufacturers). 
 219. Frank Munger, How Can We Save the Safety Net?, 69 BROOKLYN L. REV. 543, 581 
(2004). 
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significant, even if it is only cash.  Blacks are not alone in having a lower 
value attached to their money.  Other minorities, including women and the 
poor, are essentially in the same boat.  To elevate their money’s social 
significance, all of us must begin to think and talk about money in the 
hands of members of these groups in a different way.  It is impossible for a 
group to build cultural and social capital in regard to its money if we 
dissociate them from money; harbor stereotypes about their money, its 
sources, or its uses; or denounce money with “righteous indignation” in the 
mistaken belief that their cause will be advanced thereby.  It is better to 
think of money as a complex social invention and a cultural artifact not 
totally unresponsive to collective agency.  Money might be viewed as, in 
the words of Carl Sandberg, “power, freedom, a cushion, the root of all 
evil, the sum of blessings.”220 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article makes three points.  First, predatory lenders thrive by taking 
advantage of their customers’ familiarity and comfort with, and resulting 
preference for, informal modes of transacting.  Of course, there is 
deception involved in this because in many cases the corporate identity of 
the real party in interest is not disclosed to the borrower and the formality 
of the transaction becomes clear only after the customer defaults.  Second, 
in the case of minority customers in particular, the preference for 
informality in financial transactions is an aspect of the powerful 
socialization of the cash economy to which these customers and their 
parents and grandparents have been confined because of racial and class 
discrimination.  The preference will theoretically be affected by a change in 
the material circumstances of the customers, particularly by greater access 
to trustworthy sources of credit.  Because the habits and practices will 
outlive the material conditions that spawned them, however, it is important 
that the positive aspects of informality be employed to stop the exploitation 
and to begin the economic integration of such small-sum borrowers.  
Furthermore, initiatives for ending the devaluation of minority customers’ 
money should also enhance their financial advancement.  Third, the true 
democratization of credit, which predatory lending does not represent, 
should foster the enhanced well-being for the least-well off borrowers.  
Those borrowers very likely need the protection of informality to become 
full citizen-consumers in the modern economy in which credit plays an 
important role in contributing to the social safety net protecting the most 
vulnerable debtors and thereby assuring a good life for ever more 
Americans. 
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